040174 KU Personnel Economics II (MA) (2023S)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
service email address: opim.bda@univie.ac.at
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Mo 13.02.2023 09:00 bis Mi 22.02.2023 12:00
- Anmeldung von Mo 27.02.2023 09:00 bis Di 28.02.2023 12:00
- Abmeldung bis Fr 17.03.2023 23:59
Details
max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
Midterm: DO 01.06.2023_16.45-18.15_Hörsaal 6
Endterm: DO 29.06.2023_16.45-18.15_Hörsaal 4
Dieser Termin wird am DI 27.06.2023 von 18.30-20.00 im Hörsaal 15 nachgeholt.Weiters wird die Kurseinheit am Di. 06.06.2023 entfallen.
Stattdessen wird eine Kurseinheit am Mo. 22.05.2023 von 15:00 - 16:30 im HS 9 angeboten.
Donnerstag
04.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag
09.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Donnerstag
11.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag
16.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Montag
22.05.
15:00 - 16:30
Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Dienstag
23.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Donnerstag
25.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag
13.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Donnerstag
15.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag
20.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Donnerstag
22.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag
27.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag
27.06.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
Classroom participation is immanently relevant for examination („dieser Kurs ist eine Lehrveranstaltung mit immanentem Prüfungscharakter“). To pass the course, students must collect at least half of the total points of the combined two exams, the midterm and the final.Make-up exams are only available for students on sick leave (documented by immediately handing in a doctor’s sickness note at the chair’s office) or leaves supported by formal decision of the university, the faculty, and/or the institute. No passing grade may be granted if the student misses more than 10% of the total class time.
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
Going beyond the fundamentals of incentive setting, this course discusses union and labor market regulation effects on individual firm’s employment decisions, the choice between salary and incentive pay, promotion and wage promises, as well as the benefits of alternative means of pay. Rigorous analytics are combined with econometric models to test the theories’ implications.
Prüfungsstoff
Please check Moodle
Literatur
Literature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.2. Salary vs. incentive pay(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output successLiterature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefitsLazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output successLiterature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefitsLazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Do 01.06.2023 14:26
1. Imperfect labor markets and labor market institutions(a) Is there equal treatment? The stylized facts of the Austrian labor market
(b) Wage compression
(c) Shortening the hours of workLiterature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.2. Salary vs. incentive pay(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output successLiterature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefitsLazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.