040029 UK Applied Microeconomics (MA) (2014W)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
Masterstudents: If you wish to attend this course, please write to Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, email: philipp.schmidt-dengler@univie.ac.at, explaining why you want to take this course and how far you have progressed in your studies.PhD-Students: for regristration, please send an email to philipp.schmidt-dengler@univie.ac.at
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Mo 15.09.2014 09:00 bis Mi 24.09.2014 14:00
- Abmeldung bis Di 14.10.2014 23:59
Details
max. 30 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
Dienstag
07.10.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
14.10.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
21.10.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
28.10.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
04.11.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
11.11.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
18.11.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
25.11.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
02.12.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
09.12.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
16.12.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
13.01.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Dienstag
20.01.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag
26.01.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 6 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Dienstag
27.01.
09:45 - 11:15
Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
- Homework assignments (computational exercise) (60%)
- Presentation (30%)
- Classroom participation (10%)
- Presentation (30%)
- Classroom participation (10%)
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
Course Level: Ph.D., Master Students with graduate level training in Microeconomics and
Econometrics are in principle eligible. If you are a Master student interested in taking
this course, please come and see me during office hours in September so that we can
assess whether your training is appropriate.Prerequisites: Graduate Core Courses, in particular, Microeconomics and Econometrics,
ideally some background in Industrial Organization
Econometrics are in principle eligible. If you are a Master student interested in taking
this course, please come and see me during office hours in September so that we can
assess whether your training is appropriate.Prerequisites: Graduate Core Courses, in particular, Microeconomics and Econometrics,
ideally some background in Industrial Organization
Prüfungsstoff
Lecture (2 hours)
Literatur
The following texts may be provide a helpful overview of the ma-
terial that we intend to cover
- Timothy F Bresnahan. Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook
of industrial organization, 2:1011-1057, 1989
- Peter C Reiss and Frank A Wolak. Structural econometric modeling: Rationales and
examples from industrial organization. Handbook of econometrics, 6:4277-4415, 2007
- Daniel Ackerberg, C Lanier Benkard, Steven Berry, and Ariel Pakes. Econometric tools
for analyzing market outcomes. Handbook of econometrics, 6:4171-4276, 2007
- Peter Davis and Eliana Garc´es. Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis. Princeton University Press, 2009
- Ken Hendricks and Robert H Porter. An empirical perspective on auctions. Handbook
of Industrial Organization, 3:2073-2143, 2007
- Susan Athey and Philip A Haile. Nonparametric approaches to auctions. Handbook of
econometrics, 6:3847-3965, 2007
- Harry J Paarsch and Han Hong. An introduction to the structural econometrics of
auction data. MIT Press Books, 1, 2006
terial that we intend to cover
- Timothy F Bresnahan. Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook
of industrial organization, 2:1011-1057, 1989
- Peter C Reiss and Frank A Wolak. Structural econometric modeling: Rationales and
examples from industrial organization. Handbook of econometrics, 6:4277-4415, 2007
- Daniel Ackerberg, C Lanier Benkard, Steven Berry, and Ariel Pakes. Econometric tools
for analyzing market outcomes. Handbook of econometrics, 6:4171-4276, 2007
- Peter Davis and Eliana Garc´es. Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis. Princeton University Press, 2009
- Ken Hendricks and Robert H Porter. An empirical perspective on auctions. Handbook
of Industrial Organization, 3:2073-2143, 2007
- Susan Athey and Philip A Haile. Nonparametric approaches to auctions. Handbook of
econometrics, 6:3847-3965, 2007
- Harry J Paarsch and Han Hong. An introduction to the structural econometrics of
auction data. MIT Press Books, 1, 2006
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28
demand estimation, entry models and production function estimation. The emphasis
will be on recent empirical papers estimating static models. These models are the foun-
dation of most applied structural work in Marketing, Health, Trade, Environment, and
Finance. They also serve as the basis for dynamic models wich will be covered in a
course to be offered in a later semester. We will cover both technical details (specifica-
tion, estimation strategy, identification and economic interpretation) and applications.Course Outline
- Introduction to Empirical Industrial Organization
- Timothy F. Bresnahan. Competition and collusion in the american automobile
industry: The 1955 price war. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4):457-482,
1987
- Robert H Porter. A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-
1886. The Bell Journal of Economics, pages 301-314, 1983
- Demand for Differentiated Products
- Steven Berry. Estimating discrete choice models of product differentiation. RAND
Journal of Economics, 25:242-262, 1994
- Steven T. Berry, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. Automobile prices in market
equilibrium. Econometrica, 63(4):841-890, 1995
- Applications and Improvements of BLP Model
- Aviv Nevo. Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Econometrica
, 2(69):307-342, 2001
- Amil Petrin. Quantifying the benefits of new products: The case of the minivan.
Journal of Political Economy, 110(4):705-729, 2002
- Steven Berry, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. Differentiated products demand
systems from a combination of micro and macro data: The new car market. Journal
of Political Economy, 112(1):68-105, 2004
- Production Function Estimation
- G Steven Olley and Ariel Pakes. The dynamics of productivity in the telecommu-
nications equipment industry. Econometrica, pages 1263-1297, 1996
- Amil Petrin. Quantifying the benefits of new products: The case of the minivan.
Journal of Political Economy, 110(4):705-729, 2002
- Daniel A Ackerberg, Kevin Caves, and Garth Frazer. Structural identification of
production functions. 2006
- Static Entry/Exit Models and the Moment Inequality Approach
- Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Empirical models of discrete games.
Journal of Econometrics, 48(1):57-81, 1991
- Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Entry and competition in concentrated
markets. Journal of Political Economy, pages 977-1009, 1991
- Katja Seim. An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type
choices. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3):619-640, 2006
- Ariel Pakes, Jack Porter, Kate Ho, and Joy Ishii. Moment inequalities and their
application. Technical report, cemmap working paper, Centre for Microdata Meth-
ods and Practice, 2007
- Auctions
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, Herve Ossard, and Quang Vuong. Econometrics of first-price
auctions. Econometrica, pages 953-980, 1995
- Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. Optimal nonparametric
estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3):525-574, 2000
- Jakub Kastl. Discrete bids and empirical inference in divisible good auctions. The
Review of Economic Studies, 78(3):974-1014, 2011
- Ali Hortacsu and David McAdams. Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in di-
visible good auctions: an empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market.
Journal of Political Economy, 118(5):833-865, 2010