Universität Wien
Achtung! Das Lehrangebot ist noch nicht vollständig und wird bis Semesterbeginn laufend ergänzt.

040688 FK KFK ORPE/PÖ: Advanced Personnel Economics (2012W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung


Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").


max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch


Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

Donnerstag 29.11. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Dienstag 04.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Donnerstag 06.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Dienstag 11.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Donnerstag 13.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Dienstag 18.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Dienstag 08.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Donnerstag 10.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Dienstag 15.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Donnerstag 17.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Dienstag 22.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
Donnerstag 24.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7


Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

Going beyond the fundamentals of incentive setting, this course discusses the wage setting problem, the interplay between effort incentives and ability selection, the (possible) benefits of direct vs. relative incentive setting, and the enhanced incentive structure of labor contracts. Rigorous theoretic modeling is always combined with empirical testing of the respective arguments.
1. Imperfect labor markets and labor market institutions

(a) Is there equal treatment? The stylized facts of the Austrian labor market
(b) Wage compression
(c) Shortening the hours of work

Literature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.

2. Salary vs. incentive pay

(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output success

Literature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.

3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.

4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefits

Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Classroom participation is immanently relevant for examination ("dieser Kurs ist eine Lehrveranstaltung mit immanentem Prüfungscharakter"). Every topic will be additionally covered by asking students´ to work on take-home problems. These will be available via the net and are relevant for the exams in addition to the material provided as lectures. Exams will be open-book. To pass the course, students must collect at least half of the total points of the combined two exams, the midterm and the final exam.
Make-up exams are only available for students on sick leave (documented by immediately handing in a doctor s sickness note at the chair s office) or leaves supported by formal decision of the university, the faculty, and/or the institute. A passing grade may not be granted if the student misses more than 10% of the total class time.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab



It is necessary that students prepare the selected chapters from textbooks listed in the course outline above. More references may be added as the course proceeds.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29