Universität Wien
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180178 SE Metaphysics of Agency (2025W)

5.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Moodle

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Details

max. 30 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

  • Dienstag 14.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 21.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 04.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 11.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 18.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 25.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 02.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 09.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 16.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 13.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 20.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock
  • Dienstag 27.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 3B NIG 3.Stock

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

COURSE CONTENT:

How do actions fit into the natural world? This question invites a counter-question: Why should actions not fit into the natural world? As it happens, attempts to naturalise agency in contemporary analytic action theory face serious difficulties. These difficulties are interrelated with the ontological or metaphysical beliefs about agency, agents, nature, and causation that are common among action theorists.

Are actions mental events that supervene upon physical events? Can we provide causal explanations of actions? If so, are actions, qua events, caused by other events, namely by those that, under a mental description, qualify as reasons, as Donald Davidson has suggested? Or are actions rather caused by agents, as the so-called agent-causalists claim? Is natural causation best understood as event causation in accordance with a mechanistic concept of nature? What is mental causation, and is it even possible? Are agents substances or processes? Are there non-human agents, such as animals or robots?

In this Master’s course, we will discuss these and other questions on the basis of classic and recent readings in analytic action theory. The overall objective is to provide an introduction to action theory. The specific aim is to uncover the metaphysics behind action theory, and to understand how different metaphysical theories of agency, together with broader metaphysical outlooks, give rise to different views of the possibility to naturalise agency. In doing so, we will also touch upon related debates, such as those on free will, the mind-body problem, and moral responsibility, and we will engage with some empirical studies, particularly in cognitive science and biology, and with feminist perspectives.

OBJECTIVES:

Students will be expected to read, critically evaluate, and discuss key texts in action theory. They will acquire the conceptual tools necessary to analyse and critique various theoretical positions in the field, with particular attention to their underlying metaphysical commitments. Students will also be encouraged to develop their critical and analytical skills through independent research.

METHODS:

Close reading and critical discussion; short presentations; discussion summaries; exposé of a seminar paper; seminar paper.
Short presentations and discussion summaries will be assigned during the first session and must be uploaded to Moodle before each session. Syllabus and seminar readings will be made available on Moodle. The seminar will be held in English.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

MODES OF ASSESSMENT:

short presentation/discussion summary (to be uploaded to Moodle and presented in class); exposé of the seminar paper (due on 9th December 2026); seminar paper (due on 15th February 2026); improved versions of failed seminar papers are due on 8th March 2026

PERMITTED TOOLS:

By enrolling on this course, you are agreeing to complete all written assignments independently. The essence of philosophy is thinking for yourself. This course is designed to develop your critical thinking skills and improve your ability to write about philosophical questions academically. As is well known, writing is thinking.

Outsourcing your writing to generative AI means you miss out on the valuable experience of developing your own philosophical ideas and expressing them in writing. It also puts you at risk of failing to meet academic standards, since critical thinking is precisely what generative AI cannot provide.

For these reasons, the use of generative AI tools in this course is strictly limited to language polishing and must be explicitly acknowledged. You must not use AI to generate any substantive content for your written assignments.

Any other AI usage that supports your writing must be declared and fully documented. This documentation must specify: (i) which AI tool(s) were used; (ii) the exact prompts entered; and (iii) how the AI-generated output was used.

The extent of AI use will be taken into account in grading.

Undeclared use of AI tools is strictly prohibited. I reserve the right to require any student to take an oral examination on their seminar paper (“notenrelevantes Gespräch”), during which they will be asked to explain and defend the structure, methodology, theses, arguments and the selection of sources as well as specific sections of their seminar paper.

If the conversation shows that the student is not able to sufficiently elaborate on the contents, methods, sources used and conclusion of the seminar paper, the seminar paper will be assessed negatively. If the conversation clearly shows that the student used unauthorised aids, a study law procedure will be initiated due to the use of unauthorised aids. Otherwise, the lecturer’s initial assessment remains unchanged.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS:

• Presence in class (no more than 1 absence tolerated)
• Active participation in classroom discussion
• Short presentation or discussion report
• Exposé of the seminar paper (500 words)
• Seminar paper of 7,000 words minimum and 8,000 words maximum (including footnotes, excluding bibliography)
• Possibly an oral examination (‘notenrelevantes Gespräch’) (on site, by appointment)

To pass the seminar you must (i) meet all the requirements listed above AND (ii) achieve a pass grade (= 4) in the seminar paper by obtaining at least 40 out of 90 points.

If conditions (i) and (ii) are met, your final grade will be determined by your required contributions to the seminar sessions (comprising a presentation, a discussion report and active participation in classroom discussions; together accounting for 10% of the total grade, or 10 points) and the grade of your seminar paper (weight: 90%, or up to 90 points).
You must obtain a minimum total of 50 points. Contributions of an exceptionally high quality to seminar sessions will be rewarded with up to 10 additional points.

Seminar grading scheme:

1: 89-100 points
2: 76-88 points
3: 63-75 points
4: 50-62 points
5: 0-49 points

CRITERIA OF ASSESSMENT OF SEMINAR PAPERS:

• Factual correctness and accuracy
• Intellectual rigour
• Level of philosophical understanding
• Originality of the thesis defended
• Familiarity with the relevant literature
• Clarity in writing
• Formal standards of academic writing

Seminar papers must neither fall short of nor exceed the word limit, which includes footnotes but excludes bibliography. The precise word count must be written on the coversheet. Seminar papers that do not comply with the set word count requirement will be penalised.

Thorough referencing, with precise page numbers and explanatory notes demonstrating that all cited sources have been read and understood, is a strict requirement for passing the seminar paper.

Upon enrolment in this course, you tacitly agree to having all your written assignments checked by the plagiarism detection software Turnitin.

Prüfungsstoff

The assessment will be based on the literature that has been read and discussed in class, as well as on any related readings that have been agreed upon individually.

Literatur

RELEVANT LITERATURE (selection; not identical with the compulsory reading list):

Alvarez, Maria & Hyman, John, “Agents and Their Actions”, Philosophy 73, 1998, 101-121.
Anscombe, Gertrude E. M., Intention, Oxford, 1957.
Arnellos, Argyris & Moreno, Alvaro, “Multicellular Agency: An Organizational Account”, Biology & Philosophy 30, 333-357.
Bishop, John C., Natural Agency. An Essay on the Causal Theory of Agency, Cambridge, 1989.
Bishop, John C., “Exercising control in practical reasoning: Problems for naturalism about agency”, Philosophical Issues 22(1), 2012, 53-72.
Burge, Tyler, “Primitive Agency and Natural Norms”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(2), 2009, 251-278.
Brancazio, Nick ,“Gender and the Senses of Agency”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18, 2019, 425-440.
Campbell, Richard, “The Emergence of Action”, New Ideas in Psychology 28, 2010, 283-295.
Chisholm, Roderick M., “The Agent as a Cause”, in: Brand, M. & Walton, D. (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht & Boston, 1976, 199-211.
Clark, Randolph, “Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86, 408-421.
Davidson, Donald, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, 1980.
Frankfurt, Harry, “The Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 1978, 157-162.
Gallagher, Shaun, Action and Interaction, Oxford, 2020.
Ginet, Carl, “An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent”, in: Nannini, S. & Lumer, C. (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy, Farnham.
Hornsby, Jennifer, “Agency and Actions”, in: Hyman, J. & Steward, H. (eds.), Agency and Action, Cambridge, 2004, 1-23.
Hurley, Susan, “Animal Action in the Space of Reasons”, Mind & Language 18(3), 231-256.
Lowe, E. Jonathan, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford, 2008.
Meincke, Anne Sophie, “Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents”, in: Christian, A., Hommen, D., Retzlaff, N. & Schurz, G. (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities, Dordrecht, 2018, 65-93.
Meyers, Diana T., Being Yourself : Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life, Lanham, 2004.
Moreno, Alvaro, “On Minimal Autonomous Agency: Natural and Artificial”, Complex Systems 27(3), 2018, 289-313.
O’Connor, Timothy, “Agent-Causal Power”, in: Handfield, Toby (ed.), Dispositions as Causes, Oxford, 189-214.
Schlosser, Andreas, “Agent-Causation and Agential Control”, Philosophical Explorations 11, 3-21.
Steward, Helen, A Metaphysics for Freedom, Oxford, 2012.
Steward, Helen, “Actions as Processes”, Philosophical Perspectives 26(1), 2012, 373-388.
Steward, Helen, “Making the Agent Reappear: How Processes Might Help”, in: Altshuler, R. & Sigrist, M. J. (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action, London, 2016, 67-83.
Steward, Helen, “Substances, Agents and Processes”, Philosophy 95, 2019, 41-61.
Velleman, David, “What Happens When Someone Acts?”, Mind 101(403), 1992, 461-481.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Di 30.09.2025 15:06