Universität Wien

040946 SE IM/KFK PÖ: Advanced Personnel Economics (2009S)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 24 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

Wednesday 11.03. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 18.03. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 25.03. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 01.04. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 22.04. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 29.04. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 06.05. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 13.05. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 20.05. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 27.05. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 03.06. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 10.06. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 17.06. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2
Wednesday 24.06. 10:00 - 12:00 Seminarraum 2

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

Aims and scope of the seminar

Testing Contract Theory

General description:
Since the 1970s contract theory has experienced an almost explosive growth. The principal-agent approach has developed to become one of the centerpieces of the economics of organization. However, due to its very nature drawing on private information structures it appears almost impossible to subject its basic assumptions to econometric testing. After all, a researcher who can only use publicly available data can hardly claim to be better informed than any of the actual contracting parties.
Thus, the respective empirical literature is rather limited. Successful tests require that a) some information, available only to one party at the time of contracting, becomes public at some later point in time, b) policy changes or c) nature creates new incentive structures and induce specific behavioral responses by agents, or d) the agent¿s behavior can only be explained as being induced by specific contractual clauses. The seminar will discuss selected contributions that set out to ¿test the untestable.¿ In addition, it will offer insights into a variety of interesting contracting situations since the respective investigations rather reflect case studies

Assessment and permitted materials

Grading
The final grade will be calculated as the weighted average of the grades for the seminar paper (40 %), for the presentation (40 %), and for classroom participation (20 %).

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Examination topics

Topic assignment

When registering for the seminar, all students are requested to send a short e-mail to the chair¿s office (to the hands of Ms Elke Pendl, elke.pendl@univie.ac.at) that ranks three of the topics above (chapters of the books) in a priority list. Based on these priority lists, the chair will assign topics using a first-come-first-serve rule. E-mails with priority lists must be reach the chair by before March 1, 2009. If priority lists are exhausted, the chair will assign topics by filling vacant presentation slots. They same applies to registered students who decide not to supply a priority list. Late withdrawals or changes are only allowed within the general limits published and announced by advised by the head of the faculty study programs.

Preparatory meeting: March 11, 2009, 10 -12 a.m., seminar room 2
First student presentation: March 18, 2009, 10 -12 a.m., seminar room 2
Seminar papers due by: June 30, 2009

General information:

(1) There will be an introductory meeting of the seminar on March 11, 2009. During this meeting, we will check the topic assignments. Thus, attendance is absolutely necessary. No-show-students will be replaced by students registered on the waiting list who attend the preparatory meeting and agree to comply with the seminar rules below.
(2) Seminar papers must not exceed 15 pages (minimum 11 pica letter size; double-spaced typing; 3 cm margins all around; including all figures, tables, and references). Papers can be written either in English or German. They must use appropriate citation and reference rules and obey the general ethical principles of scientific work. (Please, consult the chair¿s homepage to find additional information on this issue.) All seminar papers are due on June 30, 2009. By 3 p.m. (latest) on that day, two hard copies must be handed over to the chair¿s secretarial office. All students are additionally required to send a PDF-File containing the seminar paper to the chair¿s office: elke.pendl@univie.ac.at.
(3) In preparing both your seminar papers as well as the seminar presentation students should be aware that the journal articles provided in the topics list below constitute introductory reading material and that they are required to engage in their own literature research. Apart from the university library, the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) and EconLit may provide appropriate search engines.
(4) Each weekly seminar session (beginning with March 18, 2009, except during holidays) will be devoted to discuss one topic. If two students are assigned to one topic, they must provide a coordinated joint presentation. The maximum time per presentation is 45 minutes if there is a single presenter and one hour for joint presentations. The sequence of presentations during the semester will strictly follow the numbering of topics in the list below. Students are expected to prepare supporting slides and/or hand-outs and to speak ¿freely¿ during their presentations.
(5) Complete attendance of each session of the seminar is obligatory. Failure to comply with this rule more than twice will lead to a no-pass grade. Absolutely no exceptions apply.
(6) Students are further expected to obtain a copy of each of the papers listed below (on their own) and prepare for class. They required to actively participate in the classroom discussions and should be aware that the lecturer can call upon them for comments at any time during the seminar.

Reading list

List of Seminar Topics:

I. On the existence of asymmetric information problems
a) Chiappori, P.A. and B. Salanié (2000), Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets", Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56-78.
b) Finkelstein, A. and J. Poterba (2006, rev. 2008), Testing for Asymmetric Information Using Unused Observables in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market, NBER Working Paper No. W8045.
c) Dionne, G. C. Gourieroux and C. Vanasse (2001), Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Market, Journal of Political Economy, 109, 444¿453.

II. Selection Effects of Private Information in Policy Experiments
a) Manning, W.G., J.P. Newhouse and N. Duan (1987), Health Insurance and the Demand for
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, American Economic Review, 77, 251-277.
b) Shearer, B. (2004), Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment, Review of Economic Studies, 71, 513-534.
c) Ausubel, L. (1999), Adverse Selection in the Credit Card market, Working Paper, University of Maryland.

III. Selection Effects of Private Information in ¿Natural¿ Experiments
a) Browne, M. J. and R. Puelz (1999), The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 18, 189¿213.
b) Banerjee, A., P. Gertler, M. Ghatak (2002), Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy
Reform in West Bengal, Journal of Political Economy, 110, 239-280.
c) Chiappori, P.-A., F. Durand and P.-Y. Geoffard (1998), Moral hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment - Lessons from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, European Economic Review, 42, 499-511.

IV. Specific Labor Contract Problems
a) Oyer, P. (1998), Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 149-185.
b) Hayes, R. M. and S. Schaefer (2000), Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance, RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 273-293.
c) Paarsch, H. J. and B. Shearer (2000), Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records, International Economic Review, 41, 59-92.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29