Universität Wien

180234 SE Cristina Bicchieri: The Grammar of Society (2023W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie
Continuous assessment of course work
ON-SITE

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 30 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

Monday 02.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 09.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 16.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 23.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 30.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 06.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 13.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 20.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 27.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 04.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 11.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 08.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 15.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 22.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday 29.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

*Prerequisites:*

Familiarity with game theory is not expected, but it will definitely help you. If you wish to prepare for this course, you can find useful game theoretical background in Gibbons’ A Primer in Game Theory (Chapter 1, Sections 1.1 and 1.2 for the basics). or in the Coursera lecture from the University of British Columbia (Jackson et al, Game Theory, see esp. weeks 1 and 2 for the basics). I’ll hold office hours throughout the term, attendants not yet familiar with game theory may want to keep this in mind.

*Course Outline:*

Following Lewis (Convention: A Philosophical Study, 1969), philosophers, economists, and game theorists started to model conventions and social norms as equilibria of non-cooperative games. Non-cooperative game-theory is a branch of social mathematics which, traditionally, builds on methodological individualism and individual rationality principles. This new approach to norms, therefore, raises a host of interesting questions. Can there be adequate game-theoretical models of social norms? If so, do they help us overcome the limitations of traditional, functionalist, explanations of social norms? What are their own limitations? Do they help us cope with the problem embeddedness? Which explanatory role do they give to social norms? Finally, what can we learn from these models, and how do they relate to the traditional divide between homo economicus and homo sociologicus?

Cristina Bicchieri’s presents her own attempt to model social norms as equilibria in The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (2005). In this seminar, we will focus on this specific contribution to the above-mentioned literature. We’ll be cautious to separate her general account from her formal model, and we’ll raise some of the above-listed or other questions. At the end of the seminar, participants will feel comfortable discussing game-theoretical models of social norms. They will be aware of some of their benefits and some of their limitations.

Assessment and permitted materials

There will be a series of weekly homeworks to hand in (via Moodle). These are intended as (1) a self-help device (i.e., they should help you figure out, prior to class, whether or not you paid sufficient attention to the reading assignment of the week) and (2) a basis for collective brain-storming. For these reasons, I will evaluate them along completeness criteria only. The scale (detailed below) is such that students can skip at least one of the weekly homeworks without loosing a chance for a full grade (1).

Between week 7 and week 10 of the course, students will be asked to make a video presentation of an experimental paper (to be selected from a list I will provide). The video presentation will be evaluated on four criteria (proper account of the experiment, relationship to the mandatory read, clarity and audience friendliness, attention to recommendations), each of which is evaluated on a scale from 1 (“Very good”) to 5 (“Insufficient). The presentation grade is a weighted average of the four subgrades.

At the end of the term, each student will be asked to submit an essay. Use of AI will be permitted. Detailed assessment criteria will be shared on Moodle in due time.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Your weekly homeworks will make up 25% of your final grade. They will be evaluated according to the following scale:

1: 85-100% of the questions are completed;
2: 75-84% of the questions are completed;
3: 60-74% of the questions are completed;
4: 50-59% of the questions are completed;
5: 0-49% of the questions are completed.

Your presentation will make up 25% of your final grade. As detailed above, the grade you earn for it will be a weighted average of the subgrades.

Your final essay, 50% of your final grade, will similarly be evaluated on a scale from 1 to 5.

A positive evaluation requires that you achieve a pass grade (4) in all assessment components, and that you actively attend the seminar. Two unauthorised absences will be excused.

Conditional on fulfilling the necessary requirements just mentionned, the final grade, comprised between 1 (“Very good”) and 4 (“Adequate”), is a rounded weighted average of the separate assessment grades. A failure to abide by one of the necessary requirements yields a 5 ("Insufficient").

Examination topics

I. The Nature of Social Norms

Chapter 1: The Rules we Live By
Chapter 2: Habits of the Mind

II. Social Norms as Causal Determinants of Behavior

Chapter 3: A Taste for Fairness
Chapter 4: Covenants Without Swords

III. The Emergence of Social Norms

Chapter 5: Informational Cascades and Unpopular Norms
Chapter 6: The Evolution of a Fairness Norm

Reading list

Main text: Bicchieri, Cristina. The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

The main text is available in numerical format on u: search. Further complementary readings will be recommended and made available on MOODLE in due time. All assigned readings will be in English.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Sa 30.09.2023 13:47