Universität Wien

040026 UK Industrial Organization (BA) (2014S)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

Mittwoch 05.03. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 19.03. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 26.03. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 02.04. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 09.04. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 30.04. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 07.05. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 14.05. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 21.05. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 28.05. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 04.06. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 11.06. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 18.06. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Mittwoch 25.06. 10:00 - 10:15 Hörsaal 4 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Mittwoch 25.06. 10:15 - 11:45 Hörsaal 4 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

After the required Microeconomics and Game Theory classes, students should be familiar with the functioning and properties of perfectly competitive markets, where market participants act as price takers, and with the basic monopoly model. The basic game theory course should have made students familiar with the basic tools to sudy strategic interaction, namely Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection.
The course starts with the basic models of imperfect competition (Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg). The present course takes a theoretic approach and studies how market participants are aware of the influence of their decisions on others, taking optimal advantage of their information about the market and their competitors. The resulting market equilibrium heavily depends on the prevailing market structure -- the number of competitors, the cost structure, the choice of strategic decision variables (output, quality, location and/or price), the order of moves (sequential vs. simultaneous), product characteristics (like number of competing products and degree of product substitutability). Moreover, firms can influence market structure through advertising, product positioning, as well as through their investment on technology improvements and also by merging with or acquiring other firms.

The topics of the course will be presented by the lecturer. Problem sets will be distributed regularly through the course website. Some sessions will be devoted to the discussion of problems. Students are expected to read the material in advance so that there can be active interaction during the lectures. When problems are discussed, students are expected to have worked on the problem sets in advance. Students are expected to do the recommended readings to complement classroom discussion of the topics.

Target group: Bachelor Students in Economics (2. Studienabschnitt VWL).

Prerequisites: Microeconomics I (Mikroökonomie I) and Game Theory I (SpieltheorieI).

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Grading will be as follows. One midterm (50%) and final (50%). There will be an optional make-up exam at the end of the semester for students who want to improve their grade.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

Prüfungsstoff

Contents: The recommended readings below give author's name and the sections or chapters in the corresponding book; e.g. Cabral: 2.2-2.4 refers to the sections between 2.2 and 2.4 in Cabral's book.

Course outline
Week Topic Literature
10 Introduction, Bertrand competition C1, C7.1; CW1
11 Cournot and Stackelberg CW8; CW 13.2
12 Product Differentiation C12, CW 11
15 Bertrand Competition with Capacity Constraints C7.2; CW 8,3
16 Entry and Exit CW14, C 15
17 Collusion CW10
18 Mergers CW23,
20 Research & Development C16, 18
21 MIdterm
9 Vertical relations, foreclosure CW22, C11
23 Nonlinear Pricing and Price Discrimination I C10
24 Nonlinear Pricing and Price Discrimination II CW5
25 Final Exam

Literatur

Cabral, L., 2000. Introduction to Industrial Organization, MIT Press. [2] Church, J. and R. Ware. 2000. Industrial Organization. A Strategic Approach. McGraw-Hill.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28