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040065 UK Modelling bounded rationality (MA) (2020W)
Smart heuristics and other alternatives to rational behavior
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Mo 14.09.2020 09:00 bis Mi 23.09.2020 12:00
- Abmeldung bis Sa 31.10.2020 12:00
Details
max. 30 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
- Dienstag 06.10. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 07.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 13.10. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 14.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 20.10. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 21.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Mittwoch 28.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 03.11. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 04.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Digital
- Dienstag 10.11. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 11.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 17.11. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 18.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 24.11. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 25.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 01.12. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 02.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Mittwoch 09.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 15.12. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 16.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 12.01. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 13.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 19.01. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 20.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Dienstag 26.01. 16:45 - 18:15 Digital
- Mittwoch 27.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Rationality in economics typically refers to predictions based on expected utility maximization. Subjects need to know all their options, need to know all possible consequences of any of their choices and have to assign probabilities to any event that they are uncertain about. In this course we are interested in methodologies that do not make these heroic assumptions but satisfy some principles that identify behavior as being optimal in some sense. Behavior is optimal in a minimal sense if it can be backed up by a reason for acting. We will not limit ourselves to this minimal interpretation of optimality as this will not give us any insight as to whether we should expect such behavior to survive over time. The presumption is that a heuristic as a model of how to make choices can only emerge if it has properties that signal it out as being optimal or particularly well adapted to a situation. A central paper in this course (Schlag, 1998) was recently elected as one of the 50 most influential papers in a leading economic theory journal in the past 50 years. The objective therein is to understand how individual can learn from each other with only very limited understanding of the consequences of their behavior. It is the way that individuals learn which can make them very smart as a whole. We will also consider individuals who can only learn from their own past experiences. Buzz words include imitation, cultural evolution, heuristics, tabus and reinforcement learning. A central focus of the course will be on fostering a discussion about the philosophical and economic approaches to rationality and how the latter can be relaxed.
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
Exams will be open book. The grade of the course is based on a midterm (35%), a final exam (35%) and oral participation together with some take home assignments (30%).
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
This is both a course for the Master in Economics and for the Master in Philosophy and Economics. It should only be taken if you are familiar with expected utility theory (von Neumann Morgenstern preferences). Mathematical notation will be used to describe what individuals are doing and how this changes over time. Mathematics at a very simple level will be used to define optimality and then to compute what is optimal. In particular, the original article (Schlag, 1998) is mathematically unnecessarily advanced. We will see in the course that the basic intuition does not require such elaborate math.
Prüfungsstoff
Everything that was taught in class.
Literatur
Schlag, K.H. (1998), Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory 78 (1998), 130–156.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-economic-theory/special-issue/10FDMHVW1C5
Börgers, T., A. Morales, and R. Sarin (2004), Expedient and monotone learning rules, Econometrica 72(2), 383–405.
Weibull, J. (1997), Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press.
Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-economic-theory/special-issue/10FDMHVW1C5
Börgers, T., A. Morales, and R. Sarin (2004), Expedient and monotone learning rules, Econometrica 72(2), 383–405.
Weibull, J. (1997), Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press.
Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Fr 12.05.2023 00:12