Universität Wien

040158 UK Strategic thinking in practice (BA) (2016W)

8.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Moodle

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

Montag 03.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 04.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 10.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 11.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 17.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 18.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 24.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 25.10. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 31.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Montag 07.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 08.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 14.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 15.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 21.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 22.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Montag 28.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 29.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 05.12. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 06.12. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 12.12. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 13.12. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 09.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 10.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 16.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 17.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 23.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 24.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
Montag 30.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Dienstag 31.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 17 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

This course provides an introduction to Strategic Thinking. An individual takes part in a strategic interaction if her outcomes depend not only on her own actions but also on the action of other individuals. Examples include international relations, collective decision-making processes (such as voting), litigation, war, environmental negotiations, auctions, business interactions, biological evolution, sports competitions, internet routing etc.
The course introduces the students to modeling real-world strategic interactions using formal game theory and develops the necessary methods for analyzing the resulting game theoretic models.

Outline of the course:
1. Introduction
2. Static games, dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium
Some covered applications: Voting games, competition with market power, congestion games
3. Extensive form games, sub-game perfect equilibrium
Applications: Market leaders and followers, bargaining, vote buying.
4. Static games of imperfect information, Bayesian equilibrium
Applications: Auctions, Condorcet voting
5. Extensive form games with imperfect information, perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Applications: Reputation and signaling games, sequential voting, political platforms and lobbying

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Assessment:

Assessment will be based on one midterm and one final test (written tests, 50% each). Additionally there will be non-mandatory problem sets which, however, are highly useful for learning the material and preparing for the exams. To further incentivize completing these assignments the students can supplement their total exam score with completed problem sets. Solving at least 90% of the problems yields a maximum of 20% of the points available in the two exams that can be used to compensate for points lost in the exams. Solving at least 60% of the problems yields 5% of the maximum exam score as supplemental points.

Pre-requisites:

The course will assume basic pre-requisites in microeconomics and probability.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

Prüfungsstoff

Literatur

The text for the course is Game Theory for Applied Economics, Robert Gibbons, Princeton University Press, 1992. The course will also have relatively complete lecture slides posted on the courses Moodle page.

For reference you can also use any introductory and other game-theory books, such as Osborne, M. (2004): An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein, (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1992): Game Theory, MIT Press. Myerson, R. (1992): Game Theory, Harvard University Press.

Some of the last examples are borrowed to some extent from Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson (2006): Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28