Universität Wien

040688 FK KFK PÖ: Advanced Personnel Economics (2009W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

  • Dienstag 06.10. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 13.10. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 20.10. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 27.10. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 03.11. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 10.11. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 17.11. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 24.11. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 01.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 15.12. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 12.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 19.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7
  • Dienstag 26.01. 14:00 - 16:00 Hörsaal 7

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

Course Outline and Required Readings:

1. Introduction

(a) Some stylized facts concerning wage-differentials
(b) Basics of wage-setting in firms
(c) Determining the base wage
(d) Forms of incentive pay
(e) Fringe or social benefits

Baron, James N.; Kreps, David M.: Strategic Human Resources:
Frameworks for General Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley,
1999, Chapter 12: Compensation Systems. Forms, Bases and
Distribution of Reward, p. 284 - 312.

2. Salary vs. Incentive Pay

(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output success

Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York,
etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.

3. Relative Performance Measurement and Tournaments

(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion

Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258.

4. The Enhanced Incentive Structure

(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) The problem of setting incentives in teams and management compensation
(c) Fringe Benefits

Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 8, p. 195 - 222; Chapters 16
and 17, p. 441 - 504.

5. Self-Selection and Recruitment
(a) Characteristics of a job
(b) Self-selection of worker-types
(c) Testing and recruiting

Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapters 11-15, p. 281 - 440.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

This class is immanently relevant for examination ("dieser Kurs ist eine Lehrveranstaltung mit immanentem Prüfungscharakter"). Students can earn a maximum of 50 points on each of the two exams, the midterm and the final. *To pass the course students must collect a total of 50 points or more. *

Make-up exams are only available for students on sick leave (documented by immediately handing in a doctor's sickness note at the chair's office) or leaves supported by formal decision of the university, the faculty, and/or the institute.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

The course covers the following topics: (1) Introduction: basics of wage-setting in firms; (2) Salary vs. Incentive Pay; (3) Relative Performance Measurement and Tournaments; (4) The Enhanced Incentive Structure: lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives; reputational contracting and verification; the problem of setting incentives in teams and management compensation; "Fringe Benefits"; (5) Self-Selection and Recruitment

Prüfungsstoff

Literatur

Readings

It is necessary that students prepare selected chapters from textbooks listed in the course outline above.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29