Universität Wien FIND

040688 KU Personnel Economics II (MA) (2019W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung

service email address: opim.bda@univie.ac.at

An/Abmeldung

Details

max. 60 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

Donnerstag 10.10. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 24.10. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 31.10. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 07.11. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 14.11. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 21.11. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 28.11. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 05.12. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 12.12. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 09.01. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 16.01. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 23.01. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Donnerstag 30.01. 18:30 - 20:00 Hörsaal 4 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

Going beyond the fundamentals of incentive setting, this course discusses the wage setting problem, the interplay between effort incentives and ability selection, the (possible) benefits of direct vs. relative incentive setting, and the enhanced incentive structure of labor contracts. Rigorous theoretic modeling is always combined with empirical testing of the respective arguments.
1. Imperfect labor markets and labor market institutions

(a) Is there equal treatment? The stylized facts of the Austrian labor market
(b) Wage compression
(c) Shortening the hours of work

Literature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.

2. Salary vs. incentive pay

(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output success

Literature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.

3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.

4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefits

Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Classroom participation is immanently relevant for examination („dieser Kurs ist eine Lehrveranstaltung mit immanentem Prüfungscharakter“). To pass the course, students must collect at least half of the total points of the combined two exams, the midterm and the final exam.

The midterm and the final exam are open book exams.

Make-up exams are only available for students on sick leave (documented by immediately handing in a doctor’s sickness note at the chair’s office) or leaves supported by formal decision of the university, the faculty, and/or the institute. No passing grade may be granted if the student misses more than 10% of the total class time.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

Going beyond the fundamentals of incentive setting, this course discusses union and labor market regulation effects on individual firm’s employment decisions, the choice between salary and incentive pay, promotion and wage promises, as well as the benefits of alternative means of pay. Rigorous analytics are combined with econometric models to test the theories’ implications.

Prüfungsstoff

Siehe Lernplattform.

Literatur

Literature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.

2. Salary vs. incentive pay

(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output success

Literature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.

3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.

4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefits

Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mi 02.10.2019 13:07