120011 AR MA Adv. Course Ling. 1-5 (Adv. / Hist. & Descr. / Appl. & TEFL) = Adv. Course in English Ling. (225) (2010S)
Game theoretic models of language, knowledge, and communication
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
Diese LVA gilt für das Masterstudium English Language and Linguistics nach UG2002, das Diplomstudium (UniStG) und das Lehramt UF Englisch (UniStG).
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Mi 10.02.2010 06:00 bis Mi 17.02.2010 23:59
- Anmeldung von Sa 20.02.2010 10:00 bis Do 04.03.2010 16:00
- Abmeldung bis Mi 31.03.2010 23:59
Details
max. 30 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
- Mittwoch 10.03. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 17.03. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 24.03. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 14.04. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 21.04. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 28.04. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 05.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 12.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 19.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 26.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 02.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 09.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 16.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 23.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Mittwoch 30.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
Evaluation is based on:
(1) participation in class and the preparation of reading assignments and problem sets,
(2) a written final exam, and
(3) a term paper, which can be a literature survey, an essay, or a small research paper where you apply some of the methods that we have seen in class to a specific problem in linguistics.
(1) participation in class and the preparation of reading assignments and problem sets,
(2) a written final exam, and
(3) a term paper, which can be a literature survey, an essay, or a small research paper where you apply some of the methods that we have seen in class to a specific problem in linguistics.
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
This course is self contained; that is, no prior knowledge of game theory is required. What is required, however, is the willingness to follow a formal argument and to learn how to work with game theoretic methods.
Prüfungsstoff
Literatur
1. Aumann, R. 1976. Agreeing to Disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4, 1236--1239.
2. Hurford, J., 1989. Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device. Lingua 77, 187--222.
3. Jäger, G. 2007. Evolutionary game theory and typology. A case study, Language 83, 74--109.
4. Jäger, G. 2008. The evolution of convex categories, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 551--564.
5. Brown, B., Levinson C.S. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge University Press: New York.
6. Geanakoplos, J.D., Polemarchakis, H.M. We cann't disagree forever. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 192--200.
7. Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
8. Niyogi, P., 2006. The Computational Nature of Language Learning and Evolution, University of Chicago Press.
9. Nowak, M.A., Krakauer D. C., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028--8033.
10. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2001. Evolution of universal grammar. Science 291: 114-118.
11. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2002. Computational and evolutionary aspects of language. Nature 417, 611--617.
12. Nowak M.A., Plotkin, J.B., Jansen, V.A.A., 2000. The evolution of syntactic communication. Nature 404, 495--498.
13. Pawlowitsch, C., 2008. Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system. Games and Economic Behavior 63, 203--226.
14. Pinker, S., Nowak, M.A., Lee, J.J., 2008. The logic of indirect speech. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 833--838.
15. Rubinstein, A. 1989. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under ``almost common knowledge''. The American Economic Review 79, 385--391.
16. Rubinstein, A. 2000. Economics and Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
2. Hurford, J., 1989. Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device. Lingua 77, 187--222.
3. Jäger, G. 2007. Evolutionary game theory and typology. A case study, Language 83, 74--109.
4. Jäger, G. 2008. The evolution of convex categories, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 551--564.
5. Brown, B., Levinson C.S. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge University Press: New York.
6. Geanakoplos, J.D., Polemarchakis, H.M. We cann't disagree forever. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 192--200.
7. Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
8. Niyogi, P., 2006. The Computational Nature of Language Learning and Evolution, University of Chicago Press.
9. Nowak, M.A., Krakauer D. C., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028--8033.
10. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2001. Evolution of universal grammar. Science 291: 114-118.
11. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2002. Computational and evolutionary aspects of language. Nature 417, 611--617.
12. Nowak M.A., Plotkin, J.B., Jansen, V.A.A., 2000. The evolution of syntactic communication. Nature 404, 495--498.
13. Pawlowitsch, C., 2008. Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system. Games and Economic Behavior 63, 203--226.
14. Pinker, S., Nowak, M.A., Lee, J.J., 2008. The logic of indirect speech. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 833--838.
15. Rubinstein, A. 1989. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under ``almost common knowledge''. The American Economic Review 79, 385--391.
16. Rubinstein, A. 2000. Economics and Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Diplom 343, UF 344, MA 812
LI 12-0195, SPCode 223-225, 225, 226/228, 236/238, 721-723, M03, M04, M05
LI 12-0195, SPCode 223-225, 225, 226/228, 236/238, 721-723, M03, M04, M05
Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:33
(1) recent literature in linguistics, computer science, and mathematical biology that uses game theoretic methods to explain certain aspects of language evolution (for example, Hurford 1989, Jäger 2007, 2008, Nowak et al. 1999, 2000, 2001);
(2) models in classical game theory that investigate the role of knowledge and communication in situations of strategic interaction (for example, Aumann 1976, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1982, Rubinstein 1989); and
(3) applications of game-theoretic methods to questions in Pragmatics like persuasion or vagueness and indirectness of speech (for example, Rubinstein 2000, or Pinker et al. 2007).