142019 UE Jayantabhatta’s Nyayamanjari: Selected readings on the epistemology of medieval Nyaya (2020W)

Course content
Among the four means of knowledge (pramāṇa) enumerated in Nyāyasūtra (NS) 1.1.3 and characterized in sūtra-s 1.1.4–8, verbal communication (śabda), enumerated last in sūtra 1.1.3, is allotted by far the highest number of sūtra-s in the examination of means of knowledge in the second adhyāya of the Nyāyasūtra, where it is discussed under several perspectives. The issue of the nature of the Veda and its status as a means of knowledge becomes prominent there. Even though the philosophical tradition of Nyāya is often briefly and misleadingly designated as “logic” and even equated with it, this points at a very significant place of this at least partly “orthodox–conservative” means of knowledge within the tradition. Already in the Nyāyasūtra itself, we can also observe an intense discussion on this issue with philosophical opponents, from within and without the orthodox–Brahminical fold. When we look at the (sub)commentaries on the Nyāyasūtra and later, medieval Nyāya literature, these discussions become more and more elaborate and sophisticated. The major opponents there are formidable philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā tradition and Buddhist philosophers of the logical–epistemological tradition inaugurated by Dignāga and greatly refined by Dharmakīrti and his followers.
When we take a look at the Nyāyamañjarī (NM) by the famous Kashmirian Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa or Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (last quarter of the ninth c.), we can see that, in the two-volume edition by K.S. Varadacharya the treatment of verbal communication takes up 307 pages or some 44 % out of 703 pages of the first volume, whereas the discussion of the means of knowledge in general and perception, inference and comparison/analogy as means of knowledge altogether extends over only 386 pages. To the 307 pages in the first volume, we have to add another 262 pages of the second volume, which make up some 36% of this volume. The importance of the variety of issues centering on verbal communication as a means of knowledge is thus highlighted dramatically.
In our readings from the Nyāyamañjarī on epistemology, we will therefore focus on verbal communication and first turn to part of the controversial discussion about the proof of the state of being a means of knowledge, or authoritativeness (prāmāṇya), of the Veda by means of its having been pronounced by a trustworthy or reliable person (āpta), i.e., the Lord (īśvara). His exposition of the arguments against this claim and their refutation eventually lead Jayanta to the quotation of NS 1.1.8, where the two types of verbal communication are characterized and, in Vātsyāyana’s commentary thereon, the notion of a trustworthy or reliable person according to Nyāya is introduced, which is also addressed in NS 2.1.69 in connection with the authoritativeness of the Veda. As an introduction to this passage, we will therefore read Vātsyāyana’s commentary on NS 2.1.69 (part of which has already been studied in the seminar on verbal communication as a means of knowledge in classical Nyāya in the summer term of 2020). We will then proceed to NM Vol. 1, p. 603, line 5 to p. 610, line 11 in the edition of K.S. Varadacharya, with due consideration of the variant readings listed there and further variant readings found in other editions. During our reading, we will occasionally consult the only pre-modern commentary on the Nyāyamañjarī called Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga by Cakradhara (probably eleventh c.) and refer to notes by the various editors. Depending on our progress, we may then turn to the interesting section on the authoritativeness of the diverse rival religious traditions known to Jayanta (p. 629, line 14ff.).