180004 SE Reading Seminar in Philosophy and Economics (2024W)

*Prerequisites:*

Familiarity with game theory is not expected, but it will definitely help you. If you wish to prepare for this course, you can find useful game theoretical background in Gibbons’ A Primer in Game Theory (Chapter 1, Sections 1.1 and 1.2 for the basics) or in the Coursera lecture from the University of British Columbia (Jackson et al, Game Theory, see esp. weeks 1 and 2 for the basics). There is no necessity to cover more ground than this prior to the start of the term.

*Course Outline:*

Following Lewis (Convention: A Philosophical Study, 1969), philosophers, economists, and game theorists started to model conventions and social norms as equilibria of non-cooperative games. Non-cooperative game-theory is a branch of social mathematics which, traditionally, builds on methodological individualism and individual rationality principles. This new approach to norms, therefore, raises a host of interesting questions. Can there be adequate game-theoretical models of social norms? If so, do they help us overcome the limitations of traditional, functionalist, explanations of social norms? What are their own limitations? Do they help us cope with the problem embeddedness? Which explanatory role do they give to social norms? Finally, what can we learn from these models, and how do they relate to the traditional divide between homo economicus and homo sociologicus?

Cristina Bicchieri’s presents her own attempt to model social norms as equilibria in The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (2005). In this seminar, we will focus on this specific contribution to the above-mentioned literature. We’ll be cautious to separate her general account from her formal model, and we’ll raise some of the above-listed or other questions. At the end of the seminar, participants will feel comfortable discussing game-theoretical models of social norms. They will be aware of some of their benefits and some of their limitations.