180094 SE Know-How (2023W)

When introduced into philosophical discussion, the notion of ‘knowing how’ promised both (1) to tell us something fundamental about the kinds of creatures that we are (namely, that we are fundamentally ‘practical’ creatures, rather than purely ‘intellectual’ ones, à la Descartes) and (2) to help us resolve a number of ancient and modern philosophical puzzles, (e.g., ‘how does the mind reach out to the world?’, ‘how can we come to know any facts?’, ‘what’s the difference between doing something accidentally and doing it intentionally?’, ‘how can someone know what they should do but nevertheless not do it?’). Unfortunately, the notion itself was not as uncontroversial as its early proponents seemed to hope, and whether it can accomplish either (or any part) of the above tasks remains an open question.

What does it mean to know how to do something? Is know-how a distinctive type of knowledge? Is it distinct from knowing facts? Does knowing how to do something require having the ability to do it? Must one know how to do a thing in order to do it intentionally? And which methods are proper for deciding questions like these?

This seminar will offer students an introduction to the core questions and methods in contemporary debates about knowing how, touching on their interest to epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action.