180111 SE Moral Anti-Realism (2015W)

This course will look at moral skepticism, moral relativism, moral constructivism and moral expressivism. For each view we will look at a range of texts, either arguing for or against the view. Topics to be covered include:

1. Do moral values fit into our scientific, naturalistic view of the world? We will pay particular attention to J.L. Mackie's argument that moral values are fundamentally different to the kinds of things science deals with, and Sharon Street's argument that belief in objective moral values can't be reconciled with the theory of evolution.

2. Moral relativism is often supported by pointing to cultural diversity. When we look at the world around us, we see a wide range of moral practices, some of which seem different to our own. We will look at Michelle Moody-Adams' argument that this appearance is mistaken, as there is a lot less cultural diversity that we think.

3. The argument from diversity is connected with the argument from faultless disagreement. We seem to disagree with those from other cultures with moral practices at odds with our own, but it is hard to say why either of us is at fault. Perhaps the best thing to say is that we are both right, relative to our own culture. However, Bernard Williams has suggested a different way of thinking about diversity. When we encounter a moral viewpoint that is entirely alien to our own, our terms of moral evaluation seem to lose their grip. We will try to make sense of Williams' idea, and discuss Miranda Fricker's criticisms of it.

4. What would it mean to say that moral values are constructed by us? We will look at Christine Korsgaard's answer to this question.

5. Why think that moral judgements are meant to be true or false in the first place? Maybe saying that murder is wrong is more akin to expressing my dislike of murdering, in the same way that saying that I hate Simon is a way of expressing my dislike of Simon. We will look at A.J. Ayer's classic defence of this view.