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180142 VO The sources of epistemic normativity (2010W)

3.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie

Details

Sprache: Englisch

Prüfungstermine

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

Montag 04.10. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 11.10. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 18.10. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 25.10. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 08.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 15.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 22.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 29.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 06.12. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 13.12. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 10.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 17.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 24.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
Montag 31.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Hörsaal 3C, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/3. Stock, 1010 Wien

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

DESCRIPTION
We criticise each other's beliefs all the time. We say things like ‘She only believes her husband faithful because she is scared of divorce’; things like ‘This outright contradicts everything you believe about him’; and things like ‘He only believes that of her because she is a girl and he always thought girls stupid’. These criticisms imply that the belief in question was not formed properly. It was not formed, in other words, in accordance with procedures for correct belief-formation, maintenance and revision. ‘Epistemic norms’ are norms prescribing such procedures. Examples of epistemic norm is ‘You ought not to believe on insufficient evidence’ and ‘You ought not to have inconsistent beliefs’. We generally observe epistemic norms. When I tell you that your belief is not supported by the evidence or is inconsistent with other beliefs you have, you don't just shrug and ignore me. You either try to show me that I am wrong or you revise your belief. But why should we observe epistemic norms? This is one way of asking after the source of epistemic normativity. The central purpose of this course is to explore various accounts of this source. Three answers are floated in the literature:
(1) The pragmatic: We should observe epistemic norms if we want to attain our goals.
(2) The moral: We should observe epistemic norms in order to be virtuous.
(3) The constitutive: Acceptance of epistemic norms is constitutive of belief/ agency.
The course examines the scope and plausibility of these accounts of the source of epistemic normativity.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

One 10 page essay on a pre-set topic. Deadline: 30 April. Failure to produce the essay by this deadline results in deduction of marks.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

(1) To develop a detailed critical understanding of each of the four broad answers.
(2) To establish fruitful connections amongst these answers.
(3) To acquire a general method for asking after the source of any normative domain, e.g., morality.

Prüfungsstoff

The sessions take the lecture format.

Literatur

For weekly readings, see 'Course content (English)' above

SECONDARY READINGS

Broome, John (2005) ‘Does Rationality Give us Reasons?’ in Sosa, Ernest and Villanueva, Enrique (eds) (2005) Philosophical Issues, 15, Normativity (Supplement to NOUS).

Craig, Edward (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (New York: Oxford University Press).

Blackburn, S. (2005) ‘Faith, Belief, and Reason’ Truth: A Guide (Oxford, New York : OUP).

Cullity, Garett and Gaut, Berys (eds) (1997) Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon).

Dreier, James (1997) ‘Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality’ in Cullity and Gaut.

Feldman, Richard (1988) ‘Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection’ Philosophy of Science, 55 (218-227).
___ (2000) ‘The Ethics of Belief‘ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 3, 667-695.

Foot, Philippa (1978) ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

Gibbard, Allan (2005) ‘Truth and Correct Belief’ in Sosa and Villanueva (eds) Philosophical Issues, 15, Normativity (Supplement to NOUS).

Heal, Jane (1988) ‘The Disinterested Search for Truth’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (97-108).

Korsgaard, Christine M. (1983) ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’ Philosophical Review, 92: 2 (169-195).
___ (1997) ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’ in Cullity and Gaut (1997).

Quine, W. V. (1995) 'Epistemology Naturalized' reprinted in Moser, Paul K. and vander Nat, Arnold (eds) Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, Second Edition (New York: OUP).

Railton, Peter (2003) Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Shah, Nishi (2003) ‘How Truth Governs Belief’ The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No.4 (pp.447 - 482).

Stanley, Jason (2005) Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford: Clarendon).

Wedgwood, Ralph (2002) ‘The aim of belief’ Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 267 - 297.

Williams, Bernard (1973) ‘Deciding to believe’ Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP).

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus (1996) Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge (Cambridge: CUP).

Zemach, Eddy M. (1997) ‘Practical Reasons for Belief?’ NOUS 31:4, 1997 (525-527).

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

BA M 5.4, § 4.1.4, PP § 57.2.4, § 2.5, HPS M04

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:36