180157 KO MEi:CogSci Philosophy Discussion (2024S)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
VOR-ORT
Preparation meeting: Monday March 4th, 2024, 11:00-13:00, digital
https://univienna.zoom.us/j/66860143521?pwd=MXRlWFRhVm9aWUxNQ3BnYlRiWlZWQT09
https://univienna.zoom.us/j/66860143521?pwd=MXRlWFRhVm9aWUxNQ3BnYlRiWlZWQT09
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Do 15.02.2024 10:00 bis Di 27.02.2024 23:59
- Abmeldung bis So 31.03.2024 23:59
Details
max. 25 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
Freitag
08.03.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
Freitag
22.03.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
Freitag
12.04.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
N
Freitag
03.05.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
Freitag
24.05.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
Freitag
21.06.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
Freitag
28.06.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 2i NIG 2.Stock C0228
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
This seminar is designed to complement the course “Current Developments in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science”. The aim of this seminar is to help students deepen their understanding of recent developments at the interface between philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It will provide an opportunity for students to reflect on empirical and technological developments from a philosophical perspective, critically evaluate the role of philosophy in cognitive science, and become familiar with the method of analytical philosophy of mind.During the seminar, students will have the chance to engage in in-depth discussions on themes introduced in the course “Current Developments in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science”. The seminar will focus closely on a selection of seminal readings.The primary method of the seminar will be presentations delivered by the students, which will serve as a means to guide the discussion.
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
- Students are required to hold a presentation on a topic introduced in the lecture "Current Developments in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science"
- Active participation during the seminar sessions
- Active participation during the seminar sessions
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
- Absence tolerated in 1 out of 7 seminar sessions.
- Mandatory presentation (accounts for 50% of the grade)
- Active participation (accounts for 50% of the grade)
- Mandatory presentation (accounts for 50% of the grade)
- Active participation (accounts for 50% of the grade)
Prüfungsstoff
Der Prüfungsstoff entspricht der im Seminar diskutierten Literatur.
Literatur
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14(1), 43–64.Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the Autistic Child have a “Theory of Mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46.Bayne, T. (2006), Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will. In S. Pockett, W.P. Banks, and S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (pp. 169–186). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Block, N. (2005). Review of Action in Perception. The Journal of Philosophy, 102(5), 259–272.Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 3.Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.Dennett, D. C. (2002). Quining Qualia. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classic and Contemporary Readings (pp. 226–246). New York: Oxford University Press.Gallagher, S. (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 83–108.Gopnik, A. (1996). The Scientist as Child. Philosophy of Science, 63(4), 485–514.
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications - Reading in Mind and Language. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge: MIT Press. Chapter 1.
O’Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 24(05), 939–973.Prinz, J. (2006). Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. PSYCHE, 12(1), 1–19. Rosenthal, D. M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. J. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 729–753). Cambridge: MIT Press.Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481.Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will. American Psychologist, 54(7).Zahavi, D. (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind? In D. Zahavi, T. Grünbaum, & J. Parnas (Eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 35–63). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Brain Sciences, 24(05), 939–973.Prinz, J. (2006). Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. PSYCHE, 12(1), 1–19. Rosenthal, D. M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. J. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 729–753). Cambridge: MIT Press.Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481.Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will. American Psychologist, 54(7).Zahavi, D. (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind? In D. Zahavi, T. Grünbaum, & J. Parnas (Eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 35–63). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Fr 08.03.2024 12:06