Universität Wien

180167 KU Reasons (2024W)

10.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Moodle
Fr 25.10. 11:30-14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß

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Details

max. 30 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

  • Donnerstag 17.10. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal 5 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 9 Hof 5
  • Freitag 08.11. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 15.11. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 22.11. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 29.11. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 06.12. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 13.12. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 10.01. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 17.01. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 24.01. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß
  • Freitag 31.01. 11:30 - 14:45 Hörsaal III NIG Erdgeschoß

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

In this course, we delve deep into the nature of reasons. We will focus on several debates concerning various types of reasons in meta-ethics (main focus), philosophy of action, and epistemology. Most philosophers distinguish at least between normative reasons and motivating reasons. Roughly, normative reasons are reasons that favor or justify an action, whereas motivating reasons are reasons the agent takes to favor or justify her action and that guide her behavior. But what exactly are normative and motivating reasons? How are normative reasons connected to motivation? Are there epistemic constraints on normative reasons? How are normative reasons connected to concepts such as value or rationality? What role do reasons play in epistemology?

The course covers the following topics (and authors):

Motivating and Explanatory Reasons (Maria Alvarez, Jennifer Hornsby)
Normative Reasons: Internalism / Externalism (Bernard Williams, Michael Smith, Christine Korsgaard, Derek Parfit)
Reasons Fundamentalism (Tim Scanlon, Mark Schroeder)
Reasons and Value (Sharon Street, Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way)
Perspectivism / Objectivism (Peter A. Graham, Benjamin Kiesewetter)
Reasons and Rationality (John Broome, Niko Kolodny, Errol Lord)
Normative Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? (Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star, Jacob Nebel)
Epistemic Reasons (Clayton Littlejohn, Eva Schmidt)

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Draft and Final Paper: 50%
Outline: 20%
Reply: 20%
Active Participation and Peer Feedback: 10%

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

Your final paper will be graded according to the following criteria:
- Knowledge/understanding of primary literature
- Quality and motivation of hypothesis
- Structure of essay
- Quality/novelty of argumentation
- Support/Use of Secondary Literature

The grades are distributed as follows:
1: 87-100 points
2: 75-86 points
3: 63-74 points
4: 50-62 points
5: 0-49 points

Students must complete each assignment at a satisfactory level in order to pass the course.
Students are expected to be present at 80% of the meetings and hand in reading questions for 80% of the meetings

Each assignment must be completed to satisfaction for passing the course. Attendance of 80% of the classes is required for passing the course.

By signing up for this class, the student consents to having all their writing assignments checked by the plagiarism-software Turnetin on Moodle.

The usage of Chat-GPT or similar AI programs/models is not allowed for writing any of the assignments.

Prüfungsstoff

Reasons

Literatur

Alvarez, M. 2018. Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons and Rationality. Synthese, 195: 3293-3310.
Hornsby, J. 2008. A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons. In Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock and F. Macpherson, pp. 244-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. 1981. Internal and External Reasons. In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, pp. 101-114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, M. 1995. Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(1): 109-131.
Korsgaard, C. M. 1986. Skepticism about Practical Reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(1): 5-25.
Parfit, D. 1988. Rationality and Reasons. In Exploring Practical Philosophy, (eds.) D. Egonsson et al., pp. 17-37. Ashgate.
Schroeder, M. 2007. The Slave of the Passions. Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Selection)
Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. (Selection)
Scanlon, T.M. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Selection)
Street, S. 2008. Constructivism about Reasons. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 3, (ed.) R. Shafer-Landau, pp. 207-247. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McHugh, C. and J. Way. 2016. Fittingness First. Ethics, 126: 575-606.
Graham, P. A. 2010. In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation. Ethics, 121(1): 88-115.
Kiesewetter, B. 2018. How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence. In Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, (eds.) C. McHugh, J. Way and D. Whiting, pp. 90-115. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. 2004. Reasons. In Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, R. Jay Wallace (ed.), pp. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kolodny, N. 2005. Why Be Rational? Mind, 114(445): 509-563
Broome, John. Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4(3): 349-374.
Lord, Errol. 2017. What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!). Mind, 126(504): 1109-1154.
Kearns, S. and D. Star. 2008. Reasons: Explanations or Evidence. Ethics, 119(1): 31-56.
Nebel, J. 2019. Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought. Mind, 128(510): 459-484.
Schmidt, E. 2019. Possessing Epistemic Reasons: The Role of Rational Capacities. Philosophical Studies, 176(2): 483-501.
LittleJohn, C. 2017. How and Why Knowledge is First How and Why Knowledge is First. In Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), pp. 19-45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 30.09.2024 15:06