390022 DK PhD-M: Management Control (2010W)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
Please note that the first course unit will be held on October 19, 2010.
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Mi 08.09.2010 09:00 bis Mi 22.09.2010 17:00
- Anmeldung von Di 28.09.2010 09:00 bis Do 14.10.2010 23:59
- Abmeldung bis Do 14.10.2010 23:59
Details
max. 15 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
- Dienstag 05.10. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 12.10. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 19.10. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 09.11. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 16.11. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 23.11. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 30.11. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 07.12. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 14.12. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 11.01. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 18.01. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
- Dienstag 25.01. 18:00 - 20:00 Seminarraum 1
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
Depending on class size the midterm exam can be replaced by student presentations of take-home exercises. Otherwise, there will be written midterm and final exams. Both midterm (resp. presentations) and final score points will be equally weighted in calculating the final score. Score points for class room participation will also be added to calculate the final score. A passing grade strictly requires to earn at least 50% of the total available score points in the course. Course attendance is obligatory; leaves will only be granted in case of a documented illness -- or the like a maximum of 10 % of class room time may be missed in this case.
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
The course introduces contract theory as a methodological tool for analyzing personnel, organizational, financial and public economics problems. The ultimate course goal is twofold: a) generally, students achieve an understanding of contract theory as modelling tool within their fields of application; b) specifically, interested students learn the basic framework to develop their own contractual models and/or, respectively, empirical investigations of contract theoretical models.
Prüfungsstoff
Intensive (small) group lecturing; depending on size and time, student presentations of take-home work.
Literatur
The course is based on the following book:Salanie, B. (1997), The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.For the successful completion of the take-home and final exams, the following books are additionally required:Bolton, P. und M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:46
II. The general revelation principle
III. Moral hazard
IV. Adverse selection
V. Implicit contracts
VI. Imperfect enforcement
VII. The principal-agent structure as a negotiation problemPrerequisites: To enter the course, students must possess a qualifying degree ("Diplom" or masters degree) in business, economics or equivalent university studies. They must have very good command of intermediate micro-economics, preferably with emphasis on game-theoretic approaches, and the respective mathematics applied in microeconomic modelling.