Universität Wien

390032 DK PhD-M: Management Control (2017W)

10.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 39 - Doktoratsstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung

Moodle

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 15 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

FR wtl von 06.10.2017 bis 26.01.2018 11.30-13.00 Ort: Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

  • Freitag 06.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 13.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 20.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 27.10. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 03.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 10.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 17.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 24.11. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 01.12. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 15.12. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 12.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 19.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Freitag 26.01. 11:30 - 13:00 Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

I. Contract theory as an analytical tool
II. The general revelation principle
III. Moral hazard
IV. Adverse selection
V. Implicit contracts
VI. Imperfect enforcement
VII. The principal-agent structure as a negotiation problem

Prerequisites: To enter the course, students must possess a qualifying degree ("Diplom" or masters degree) in business, economics or equivalent university studies. They must have very good command of intermediate micro-economics, preferably with emphasis on game-theoretic approaches, and the respective mathematics applied in microeconomic modelling.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

Regular take-home tasks and final exam. Score points for class room participation will be added to calculate the final score.
A passing grade strictly requires to earn at least 50% of the total available score points in the course. Course attendance is obligatory; leaves will only be granted in case of a documented illness -- or the like a maximum of 10 % of class room time may be missed in this case.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

The course introduces contract theory as a methodological tool for analyzing personnel, organizational, financial and public economics problems. The ultimate course goal is twofold: a) generally, students achieve an understanding of contract theory as modelling tool within their fields of application; b) specifically, interested students learn the basic framework to develop their own contractual models and/or, respectively, empirical investigations of contract theoretical models.

Prüfungsstoff

Intensive (small) group lecturing; depending on size and time, student presentations of take-home work.

Literatur

The course is based on the following book:

Salanie, B. (1997), The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.

For the successful completion of the take-home and final exams, the following books are additionally helpful:

Bolton, P. und M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.

For the successful completion of the take-home and final exams, the following books are additionally required:

Bolton, P. und M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:46