040035 UK Strategy and Information (MA) (2019W)
Non-Cooperative Game Theory with Applications; Track in Competition and Regulation
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Mo 16.09.2019 09:00 to Mo 23.09.2019 12:00
- Registration is open from Th 26.09.2019 09:00 to Fr 27.09.2019 12:00
- Deregistration possible until Mo 14.10.2019 12:00
Details
max. 50 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
Friday
04.10.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
07.10.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
11.10.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
14.10.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
18.10.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
21.10.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
25.10.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
28.10.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Monday
04.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
08.11.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
11.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
15.11.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
18.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
22.11.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
25.11.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
29.11.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
02.12.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
06.12.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
09.12.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
13.12.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
16.12.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
10.01.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
13.01.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
17.01.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
20.01.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
24.01.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Monday
27.01.
11:30 - 13:00
Seminarraum 1 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Friday
31.01.
13:15 - 14:45
Seminarraum 3 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
This is an advanced course in game theory and its applications. The goal of the course is to give the students a comprehensive picture of the theory of non-cooperative strategic interaction and relate it to some interesting applications. The course will review the basic concepts such as dominance, Nash equilibrium and sub-game perfect equilibrium and then move fairly swiftly to analyzing strategic interaction with asymmetric or imperfect information. Applications analyzed in the course include but are not limited to topics like auctions, bargaining, voting, insurance, public good provision and job market signaling.
Assessment and permitted materials
Final grades will calculated as 40% midterm exam grade, 40% final exam grade and 20% problem set grade.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
Requirements: Students should have taken an introductory course in game theory as some familiarity with the basic concepts of game theory is expected. The course also requires students to write small formal proofs and arguments and hence some prior practice in mathematics, especially introductory level probability theory will help passing the course. Knowing basic formulas like the law of total probability and Bayes' rule will be extremely helpful.
Examination topics
- Normal form games
- Extensive form games
- Games of imperfect information/signaling/reputation
- Mechanism design
- Extensive form games
- Games of imperfect information/signaling/reputation
- Mechanism design
Reading list
- Course will have self-contained slides.
- The course covers parts from the following text books:
Gibbons, Robert. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press, 1992.
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1991.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2002.
- The course covers parts from the following text books:
Gibbons, Robert. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press, 1992.
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1991.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2002.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:19