040172 UK Applied Economentrics: Empirical Industrial Organization and Strategic Interaction (BA) (2016S)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from We 17.02.2016 09:00 to We 24.02.2016 12:00
- Deregistration possible until Mo 14.03.2016 23:59
Details
max. 50 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
- Tuesday 01.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 07.03. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 08.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 14.03. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 15.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 04.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 05.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 11.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 12.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 18.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 19.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 25.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 26.04. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
- Monday 02.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 03.05. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
- Monday 09.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 10.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 23.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 24.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 30.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 31.05. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
- Monday 06.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 07.06. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
- Monday 13.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 14.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 20.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 21.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Monday 27.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
- Tuesday 28.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
We will first review basic game theory and econometrics. There will be two early quizzes on the review material to make sure everybody has the necessary tools to follow the course material. Then students will carry out small empirical projects which have to be written up in groups. Finally, students will have to present a recent empirical paper related to the course content and write a report on it.
Grading: Quizzes: 30%, Empirical Projects 35%, Presentation and Report 35%
Grading: Quizzes: 30%, Empirical Projects 35%, Presentation and Report 35%
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
This is a course for advanced bachelor students in economics, who have already taken courses in microeconomics, game theory, and econometrics.
Examination topics
Reading list
Price and Quantity Setting in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
-Timothy F Bresnahan. Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook
of industrial organization, 2:1011-1057, 1989
-Timothy F Bresnahan. The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics
Letters, 10(1):87-92, 1982Competition and Collusion
-Timothy F. Bresnahan. Competition and collusion in the american automobile
industry: The 1955 price war. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4):457-482,
1987
- Robert H Porter. A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-
1886. The Bell Journal of Economics, pages 301-314, 1983
Entry
- Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Entry and competition in concentrated
markets. Journal of Political Economy, pages 977-1009, 1991
- Steven T Berry. Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 889-917, 1992
- Katja Seim. An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type
choices. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3):619-640, 2006
Empirical Models of Auctions
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, Herve Ossard, and Quang Vuong. Econometrics of first-price
auctions. Econometrica, pages 953-980, 1995
- Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. Optimal nonparametric
estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3):525-574, 2000
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Horta¸csu. Economic insights from internet auctions. Journal
of Economic Literature, 42(2):457-486, 2004
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu. The winner’s curse, reserve prices, and endoge-
nous entry: empirical insights from ebay auctions. RAND Journal of Economics,
pages 329-355, 2003
Collusion in Auctions
- Robert H Porter and J Douglas Zona. Detection of bid rigging in procurement
auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 101(3):518-38, 1993
- Patrick Bajari and Lixin Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 85(4):971-989, 2003
- Martin Pesendorfer. A study of collusion in first-price auctions. The Review of
Economic Studies, 67(3):381-411, 2000
Sports
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Beautiful Game Theory: How Soccer Can Help Economics
. Princeton University Press, 2014
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Professionals play minimax. The Review of Economic
Studies, 70(2):395-415, 2003
- P-A Chiappori, Steven Levitt, and Timothy Groseclose. Testing mixed-strategy
equilibria when players are heterogeneous: the case of penalty kicks in soccer.
American Economic Review, pages 1138-1151, 2002Useful books for background reading:-J. Church and R. Ware, Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw Hill, 2000,
This book is now available online and can be downloaded for free at http://homepages.ucalgary.ca/~jrchurch/page4/page4.html
-R. Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
-J. Tirole: Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1989
-P. Davis and E. Garcés, Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis, Princeton University Press, 2009.
-P. Belleflamme and M. Peitz, Industrial organization: markets and strategies, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
-Timothy F Bresnahan. Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook
of industrial organization, 2:1011-1057, 1989
-Timothy F Bresnahan. The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics
Letters, 10(1):87-92, 1982Competition and Collusion
-Timothy F. Bresnahan. Competition and collusion in the american automobile
industry: The 1955 price war. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4):457-482,
1987
- Robert H Porter. A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-
1886. The Bell Journal of Economics, pages 301-314, 1983
Entry
- Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Entry and competition in concentrated
markets. Journal of Political Economy, pages 977-1009, 1991
- Steven T Berry. Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 889-917, 1992
- Katja Seim. An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type
choices. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3):619-640, 2006
Empirical Models of Auctions
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, Herve Ossard, and Quang Vuong. Econometrics of first-price
auctions. Econometrica, pages 953-980, 1995
- Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. Optimal nonparametric
estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3):525-574, 2000
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Horta¸csu. Economic insights from internet auctions. Journal
of Economic Literature, 42(2):457-486, 2004
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu. The winner’s curse, reserve prices, and endoge-
nous entry: empirical insights from ebay auctions. RAND Journal of Economics,
pages 329-355, 2003
Collusion in Auctions
- Robert H Porter and J Douglas Zona. Detection of bid rigging in procurement
auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 101(3):518-38, 1993
- Patrick Bajari and Lixin Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 85(4):971-989, 2003
- Martin Pesendorfer. A study of collusion in first-price auctions. The Review of
Economic Studies, 67(3):381-411, 2000
Sports
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Beautiful Game Theory: How Soccer Can Help Economics
. Princeton University Press, 2014
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Professionals play minimax. The Review of Economic
Studies, 70(2):395-415, 2003
- P-A Chiappori, Steven Levitt, and Timothy Groseclose. Testing mixed-strategy
equilibria when players are heterogeneous: the case of penalty kicks in soccer.
American Economic Review, pages 1138-1151, 2002Useful books for background reading:-J. Church and R. Ware, Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw Hill, 2000,
This book is now available online and can be downloaded for free at http://homepages.ucalgary.ca/~jrchurch/page4/page4.html
-R. Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
-J. Tirole: Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1989
-P. Davis and E. Garcés, Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis, Princeton University Press, 2009.
-P. Belleflamme and M. Peitz, Industrial organization: markets and strategies, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28
experimental data. Applications include the identification of conduct (competition and
collusion), auctions, market entry models, and sports. The emphasis will be on recent
empirical papers. We will review basic concepts early in the course, but students
are expected to be familiar with basic game-theoretic concepts and econometric tools
(e.g. Instrumental Variables, Maximum-Likelihood Estimation).