040174 KU Personnel Economics II (MA) (2023S)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
service email address: opim.bda@univie.ac.at
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Mo 13.02.2023 09:00 to We 22.02.2023 12:00
- Registration is open from Mo 27.02.2023 09:00 to Tu 28.02.2023 12:00
- Deregistration possible until Fr 17.03.2023 23:59
Details
max. 50 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
Midterm: DO 01.06.2023_16.45-18.15_Hörsaal 6
Endterm: DO 29.06.2023_16.45-18.15_Hörsaal 4
Dieser Termin wird am DI 27.06.2023 von 18.30-20.00 im Hörsaal 15 nachgeholt.Weiters wird die Kurseinheit am Di. 06.06.2023 entfallen.
Stattdessen wird eine Kurseinheit am Mo. 22.05.2023 von 15:00 - 16:30 im HS 9 angeboten.
Thursday
04.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Tuesday
09.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Thursday
11.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Tuesday
16.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Monday
22.05.
15:00 - 16:30
Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday
23.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Thursday
25.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Tuesday
13.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Thursday
15.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Tuesday
20.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Thursday
22.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Tuesday
27.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Tuesday
27.06.
18:30 - 20:00
Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
Classroom participation is immanently relevant for examination („dieser Kurs ist eine Lehrveranstaltung mit immanentem Prüfungscharakter“). To pass the course, students must collect at least half of the total points of the combined two exams, the midterm and the final exam.Make-up exams are only available for students on sick leave (documented by immediately handing in a doctor’s sickness note at the chair’s office) or leaves supported by formal decision of the university, the faculty, and/or the institute. No passing grade may be granted if the student misses more than 10% of the total class time.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
Going beyond the fundamentals of incentive setting, this course discusses union and labor market regulation effects on individual firm’s employment decisions, the choice between salary and incentive pay, promotion and wage promises, as well as the benefits of alternative means of pay. Rigorous analytics are combined with econometric models to test the theories’ implications.
Examination topics
Please check Moodle
Reading list
Literature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.2. Salary vs. incentive pay(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output successLiterature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefitsLazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output successLiterature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefitsLazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Th 01.06.2023 14:26
1. Imperfect labor markets and labor market institutions(a) Is there equal treatment? The stylized facts of the Austrian labor market
(b) Wage compression
(c) Shortening the hours of workLiterature: Garibaldi, Pietro: Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets, New York, N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapters 1, 2, 3.2. Salary vs. incentive pay(a) The two basic functions of incentive pay: effort incentives and ability selection
(b) Effort incentives: a simple model
(c) Ability selection: a simple model
(d) Piece-rates vs. bonus
(e) Paying for input supply or output successLiterature: Lazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.:
John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 3 - 5, p. 45 - 131.; Garibaldo, Pietro, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7.3. Relative performance measurement and tournaments
(a) Why relative performance measurement?
(b) Direct incentive pay vs. promotion ladder with risk-neutral agent
(c) A note on the effect of risk aversion
(d) Dynamic incentives
Lazear, Edward P., op. cit., Chapter 9, p. 223 - 258; Garibaldi, Pietro, op. cit., Chapter 8.4. Is cash all that counts? Alternative means of pay
(a) Lifetime employment contracts and pension incentives
(b) Team incentives and management compensation
(c) Fringe benefitsLazear, Edward P.: Personnel Economics for Managers, New York, etc.: John Wiley, 1998, Chapters 8, 16, and 17.