Universität Wien

040186 KU Contracts, coordination, and incentives (MA) (2022W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work
ON-SITE

service email address: opim.bda@univie.ac.at

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

Tuesday 04.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 11.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 18.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 25.10. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 08.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 15.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 22.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 29.11. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 06.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 13.12. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 10.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 17.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 24.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Tuesday 31.01. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal 4 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 Erdgeschoß
Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

This course provides an introduction to the theory of contracts and its applications. Many economic situations are characterized by informational asymmetry, i.e. by the fact that some party in an interaction has more information than the other. The aim of this course is to cover basic models with (and without) asymmetric information and understand its implications on decision making/incentive provision.

Among others, we will deal with the theoretical analysis of the following questions:

-Why do we engage in economic exchange?
-How exactly can and should an employer compensate its employees?
-What role does education play in the job market?
-Why do companies offer warranties on their products?
-What auction types are there and how does the optimal bid look like?
-How should a firm with market power price its products?

Assessment and permitted materials

Evaluation will be based on two written tests (mid and end-term), homework and active participation.

No formal requirements for this course. A general interest and willingness to study+understand contractual models in a formal way is required.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

It is necessary to put in daily effort in order to prepare for the following sessions and exams.
Please note that all of your submissions may be checked for plagiarism using Turnitin.

Examination topics

Topics and methodology: Decision and game theory, constrained optimization, moral hazard, adverse selection (screening, signaling), bargaining, auctions.

Reading list

Literature:
• Richard D. Freedman and Velvet V. Mickens, Salomon Brothers: “Apologies
are Bullshit”, NYU Leonard N. Stern School of Business, case study, revised
version September 2002.
• Milgrom, Paul R. and John Roberts, Economics, Organization, and
Management, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice‐Hall, Chapter 1.
• Hutchison, Harry, The Collision of Employment‐At‐Will, Section 1981 &
Gonzales: Discharge, Consent and Contract Sufficiency, Journal of Business
Law, 2001, vol. 3, p. 207‐249.
• Rolls‐Royce: Embracing IoT on a wing and prayer, Harvard Business School,
Nov. 2016: https://rctom.hbs.org/submission/rolls‐royce‐embracing‐iot‐
on‐a‐wing‐and‐a‐prayer/

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Th 18.08.2022 12:28