Universität Wien
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040206 KU Contract Theory (MA) (2024W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work
ON-SITE

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

The course runs from October 1 to November 12.

  • Tuesday 08.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 15.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 22.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 29.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 05.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 12.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 19.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 26.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 03.12. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 10.12. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 17.12. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 07.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 14.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 21.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Tuesday 28.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Hörsaal 15 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance in economics in the last fifty years. The objective of this course is to provide easy access to this theory for graduate students in business administration, economics, and finance. Most of the course is devoted to the static principal-agent model with complete contracts. The course discusses the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information in the simplest possible framework that does not require advanced game-theoretic concepts.

For more information, please refer to the course syllabus at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-6qIMYsfrGHVo0eLYuwhLJGE2Tbu-HGp/view?usp=drive_link

Assessment and permitted materials

Grades for this course will be based on a midterm exam (35%), a final exam (45%), and class participation (20%). Both exams will be closed book, that is, you are not allowed to consult your lecture notes, textbooks, or other resources during the exam.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

To pass the course, you need to achieve an aggregate score of at least 50%.

Examination topics

All topics covered in class. (Please see the course syllabus.)

Reading list

LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, and David MARTIMORT, 2002, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press.

BOLTON, Patrick, and Mathias DEWATRIPONT, 2005, Contract Theory, MIT Press.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Mo 16.09.2024 11:06