Universität Wien

040253 UK Information Economics (BA) (2024W)

8.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

see my homepage:

sites.google.com/site/dggonzal/information-economics
Moodle
We 11.12. 13:15-14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Wednesday 02.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 04.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 09.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 11.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 16.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 18.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 23.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 25.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 30.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 06.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 08.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 13.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 15.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 20.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 22.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 27.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 29.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 04.12. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 06.12. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 13.12. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 08.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 10.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 15.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 17.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 22.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 24.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Wednesday 29.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 31.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

The lecture introduces models of strategic interaction under incomplete and asymmetric information. It will focus on the following topics:

1. Information Transmission
o Main models: cheap talk, disclosure
o Fundamental question: Under what conditions does an informed sender transmit information to a decision maker?
o Examples: Should I disclose my grades at a job interview? What does a politician learn from a lobbyist's advice?

2. Asymmetric information
o Main models: moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling
o Fundamental question: How does asymmetric information affect markets and strategic interactions?
o Examples: Why should I wear a suit to a job interview? What gifts should I buy for my friends? Why are some insurances so expensive?

3. Learning
o Main models: social learning
o Fundamental question: When is it possible to learn from the actions of others?
o Examples: Does the length of the queue say something about the quality of the product?

Assessment and permitted materials

Final examination (closed book) 40%, short group presentation 30%, class participation and homework 30%.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Basic knowledge of game theory is required, for a refresher, see "A Primer in Game Theory" by Gibbons.

Examination topics

The final exam will cover the material from all lectures, handouts and homework assignments. Representative exercises will be provided and practised throughout the course.

Reading list

Lecture notes and selected research articles, e.g,Literatur
Lecture notes and selected research articles, e.g.,
- S. Grossman and O. Hart, “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,” Econometrica, 51(1), January 1983, 7-46.
- B. Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), Spring 1979, 74-91.
- I. Cho and D. Kreps, “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), May 1987, 179-222
- Sobel, Joel, “Giving and Receiving Advice,” in Daron Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano, and Eddie Dekel (eds.)
- Banerjee, A. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics CVII, 797–817.
- Bikchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, customs, and cultural change as information cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100, 992–1026.
A useful but not necessary addition: An Introduction to the Economics of Information by I. Macho-Stadler and D. Perez-Castrillo (Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 2001).

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Th 03.10.2024 16:45