040383 UK Game Theory and Industrial Organization (MA) (2017S)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
This course provides an introduction to basic concepts of Game Theory and applies these concepts to topics in Industrial Organization. Roughly speaking, Industrial Organization analyses both the functioning of markets and firms' behavior in markets.Contents:
1. Static games with complete information and the Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Cournot model)
2. Sequential games with complete information and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Stackelberg model)
3. Static games with incomplete information and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Typical application: Auctions)
4. Sequential games with incomplete information and the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Signalling model).
1. Static games with complete information and the Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Cournot model)
2. Sequential games with complete information and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Stackelberg model)
3. Static games with incomplete information and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Typical application: Auctions)
4. Sequential games with incomplete information and the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Signalling model).
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from We 15.02.2017 09:00 to We 22.02.2017 12:00
- Deregistration possible until Tu 14.03.2017 23:59
Details
max. 50 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
- Tuesday 07.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 07.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 14.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 14.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 21.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 21.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 28.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 28.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 04.04. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 04.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 25.04. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 25.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 02.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 02.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 09.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 09.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 16.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 16.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 23.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 23.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 30.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 30.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 13.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 13.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 20.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 20.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 27.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
- Tuesday 27.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 10 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
Midterm Exam (45%), Final Exam (45%), Homework Assignments (10%). Details will be provided during the first class meeting.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
Students should master intermediate microeconomics.
Examination topics
Reading list
Course textbooks:
-) Gibbons, Robert (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf (Prentice Hall).
-) Osborne, Martin J. (2004), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
-) Church, Jeffrey and Roger Ware (2000), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw-Hill.
-) Gibbons, Robert (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf (Prentice Hall).
-) Osborne, Martin J. (2004), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
-) Church, Jeffrey and Roger Ware (2000), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw-Hill.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29
Specific Contents of this Course:? Static games with complete information and the Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Cournot model)
? Sequential games with complete information and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Stackelberg model)
? Static games with incomplete information and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Typical application: Auctions)
? Sequential games with incomplete information and the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Signalling model).