Universität Wien

040827 UK Information Economics (2011S)

8.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

Wednesday 02.03. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 03.03. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 09.03. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 10.03. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 16.03. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 17.03. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 23.03. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 24.03. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 30.03. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 31.03. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 06.04. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 07.04. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 13.04. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 14.04. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 04.05. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 05.05. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 11.05. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 12.05. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 18.05. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 19.05. 13:00 - 14:30 BIG-Hörsaal Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 1 Hof 1
Wednesday 25.05. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 26.05. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 01.06. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Wednesday 08.06. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 09.06. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 15.06. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 16.06. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1
Wednesday 22.06. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Wednesday 29.06. 13:30 - 15:00 Hörsaal 2 Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 5 Hof 3
Thursday 30.06. 13:00 - 14:30 Elise Richter-Saal Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 1

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

In this course we will investigate how information, in particular how differences in information between economic agents, influences economic decisions and outcomes. An important part of the course will consist of modeling and then solving Microeconomic models that involve asymmetric information. Note that it is not always good to receive more information in strategic situations. Topics include moral hazard, signaling, adverse selection and possibly some mechanism design. Examples will include the hold up problem surrounding relation specific investments, the role of education as signaling device in the job market, the market for used cars and strategic behavior in auctions.

Assessment and permitted materials

The course consists of 4 lecture hours per week. There will be both a midterm and a final exam and some homework assignments. The midterm and the final exam contribute equally towards the final grade, grades attained in the homeworks will contribute, depending on the number of homework assignments, up to 20% of the final grade.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Examination topics

This course belongs to the general area of Microeconomics. Particular attention will be put on modeling and solving models that involve asymmetric information. An important solution tool will be Game Theory so it is strongly advisable for a participant to have previously attended a course on Game Theory. Buzz words will be perfect Bayesian equilibrium, pooling and separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Reading list

Reading list will include:
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: We 15.12.2021 00:16