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040827 UK Information Economics (2012S)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Th 09.02.2012 09:00 to Mo 20.02.2012 17:00
- Registration is open from Mo 27.02.2012 09:00 to Tu 28.02.2012 17:00
- Deregistration possible until We 14.03.2012 23:59
Details
max. 50 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
Tuesday
06.03.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
07.03.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
13.03.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
14.03.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Friday
23.03.
09:00 - 11:00
(Seminarraum 2 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Tuesday
27.03.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
28.03.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
17.04.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
18.04.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Friday
20.04.
10:30 - 13:00
(Seminarraum 1, Maria-Theresien-Str.3/Parterre, 1090 Wien)
Tuesday
24.04.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
25.04.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Wednesday
02.05.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
08.05.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
09.05.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
15.05.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
16.05.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
22.05.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
23.05.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Wednesday
30.05.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
05.06.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
06.06.
11:30 - 13:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Tuesday
12.06.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
13.06.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
19.06.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
20.06.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Tuesday
26.06.
12:30 - 14:00
(Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
Wednesday
27.06.
11:30 - 13:00
Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
In this course we will investigate how information, in particular how differences in information between economic agents, influences economic decisions and outcomes. An important part of the course will consist of modeling and then solving Microeconomic models that involve asymmetric information. Note that it is not always good to receive more information in strategic situations. Topics include moral hazard, signaling, adverse selection and possibly some mechanism design. Examples will include the hold up problem surrounding relation specific investments, the role of education as signaling device in the job market, the market for used cars and strategic behavior in auctions.
Assessment and permitted materials
The course consists of 4 lecture hours per week. There will be both a midterm and a final exam and some homework assignments. The midterm and the final exam contribute equally towards the final grade, grades attained in the homeworks will contribute, depending on the number of homework assignments, up to 20% of the final grade.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
Examination topics
This course belongs to the general area of Microeconomics. Particular attention will be put on modeling and solving models that involve asymmetric information. An important solution tool will be Game Theory so it is strongly advisable for a participant to have previously attended a course on Game Theory. Buzz words will be perfect Bayesian equilibrium, pooling and separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Reading list
Reading list will include:
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29