Universität Wien
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040827 UK Information Economics (2012S)

8.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

http://homepage.univie.ac.at/karl.schlag/SS2012/Info%20Econ%20ss12.pdf

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Tuesday 06.03. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 07.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 13.03. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 14.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Friday 23.03. 09:00 - 11:00 (Seminarraum 2 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Tuesday 27.03. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 28.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 17.04. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 18.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Friday 20.04. 10:30 - 13:00 (Seminarraum 1, Maria-Theresien-Str.3/Parterre, 1090 Wien)
  • Tuesday 24.04. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 25.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 02.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 08.05. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 09.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 15.05. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 16.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 22.05. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 23.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 30.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 05.06. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 06.06. 11:30 - 13:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Tuesday 12.06. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 13.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 19.06. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 20.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Tuesday 26.06. 12:30 - 14:00 (Seminarraum 1 Hohenstaufengasse 9 1.Stock)
  • Wednesday 27.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 31 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

In this course we will investigate how information, in particular how differences in information between economic agents, influences economic decisions and outcomes. An important part of the course will consist of modeling and then solving Microeconomic models that involve asymmetric information. Note that it is not always good to receive more information in strategic situations. Topics include moral hazard, signaling, adverse selection and possibly some mechanism design. Examples will include the hold up problem surrounding relation specific investments, the role of education as signaling device in the job market, the market for used cars and strategic behavior in auctions.

Assessment and permitted materials

The course consists of 4 lecture hours per week. There will be both a midterm and a final exam and some homework assignments. The midterm and the final exam contribute equally towards the final grade, grades attained in the homeworks will contribute, depending on the number of homework assignments, up to 20% of the final grade.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Examination topics

This course belongs to the general area of Microeconomics. Particular attention will be put on modeling and solving models that involve asymmetric information. An important solution tool will be Game Theory so it is strongly advisable for a participant to have previously attended a course on Game Theory. Buzz words will be perfect Bayesian equilibrium, pooling and separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Reading list

Reading list will include:
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29