Universität Wien

040827 UK Information Economics (2013S)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Wednesday 06.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 13.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 20.03. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 10.04. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 17.04. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 24.04. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 08.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 15.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 22.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 29.05. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 05.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 12.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 19.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9
  • Wednesday 26.06. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 32 Hauptgebäude, 1.Stock, Stiege 9

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

In this course we will investigate how information, in particular how differences in information between economic agents, influences economic decisions and outcomes. An important part of the course will consist of modeling and then solving Microeconomic models that involve asymmetric information. Note that it is not always good to receive more information in strategic situations. Topics include moral hazard, signaling and adverse selection. Examples will include the hold up problem surrounding relation specific investments, the role of education as signaling device in the job market, the market for used cars and strategic behavior in auctions.

Prerequisites
This course belongs to the general area of Microeconomics. Particular attention will be put on modeling and solving models that involve asymmetric information. An important solution tool will be Game Theory, so it is strongly recommended to only visit this course after having passed Game Theory 2. Buzz words will be perfect Bayesian equilibrium, pooling and separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Assessment and permitted materials

The course consists of 2 lecture hours per week. There will be a midterm, a final exam, some homework assignments and possible spontaneous exams. Spontaneous exams are
unannounced and will last approximately 10 minutes, they are there to see whether previous material has been understood.
The midterm and the final exam contribute equally towards the final grade, grades attained in the homeworks and spontaneous exams will contribute, depending on the number of homework assignments, up to 20% of the final grade.
Office hours to ask questions are Thursdays from 11-12.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Examination topics

Reading list

Reading list will include:
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29