180099 SE egalitarianism (2013S)

One form of equality, moral equality, is the cornerstone of any democracy, as it is generally accepted that each citizen should be treated morally equally. During elections, this is translated into the principle of one person/one vote. But there is also another use of the notion of equality which pertains more specifically to the distribution of advantages. In this use, equality is taken to have a crucial role for social justice.
On some conceptions of justice, it is indeed assumed that there needs to be an equalization of something, whether it is resources, welfare or capabilities. We will thus start by reading the papers of those philosophers who agree that equality should be used as a distributive principle but disagree on what needs to be equalised. These philosophers include Ronald Dworkin (equality of resources), Jerry Cohen (equality of access to advantages), Richard Arneson (equality of opportunity for welfare) and Martha Nussbaum (equality of capabilities). On other conceptions of justice, the principle of equality is opposed to other principles of distribution. We will thus discuss the writings of those who recommend the use of a different distributive principle, such as Paula Casal (sufficiency), Derek Parfit (priority) and John Rawls (the difference principle).
We will consider the question of whether equality has intrinsic value or only instrumental value. For this purpose, we will discuss the levelling down argument as expounded by Derek Parfit and consider the recent response to this argument provided by Martin O´Neill. We will then consider some of the remaining objections that have been levelled against egalitarianism. In particular, we will look at the objections raised by Elizabeth Anderson and Robert Nozick.
Finally, we will examine the question of the scope of distributive principles: Should distributive principles be restricted to nations or should they apply at the global level? Rawls has famously restricted the application of the difference principle to the liberal state. We will examine his arguments for this restriction in light of the counter-arguments formulated by cosmopolitans.