180152 KO MEi:CogSci Philosophy Discussion (2022S)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
MIXED
Preparation meeting: Tuesday March 1st, 2022, 10:00-12:00 online
https://univienna.zoom.us/j/66771830145?pwd=WkgvNzM3d0NrWk1SYkIxWXRLSjBydz09
https://univienna.zoom.us/j/66771830145?pwd=WkgvNzM3d0NrWk1SYkIxWXRLSjBydz09
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Tu 15.02.2022 10:00 to Mo 28.02.2022 10:00
- Deregistration possible until Th 31.03.2022 23:59
Details
max. 25 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
Friday
04.03.
16:45 - 18:15
Digital
Friday
01.04.
16:45 - 18:15
Digital
Friday
08.04.
16:45 - 18:15
Digital
Friday
29.04.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 3F NIG 3.Stock
Friday
13.05.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 3F NIG 3.Stock
Friday
03.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 3F NIG 3.Stock
Friday
10.06.
16:45 - 18:15
Hörsaal 3F NIG 3.Stock
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
- Students will submit short reflections addressing each seminar session’s theme.
- Students are required to hold an (online-)presentation
- Active participation during the sessions
- Students are required to hold an (online-)presentation
- Active participation during the sessions
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
- Absence tolerated in 1 out of 7 seminar sessions.
- Mandatory presentation (accounts for 30% of the grade)
- Active participation (accounts for 50% of the grade)
- Reflections (account for 20% of the grade)
- Mandatory presentation (accounts for 30% of the grade)
- Active participation (accounts for 50% of the grade)
- Reflections (account for 20% of the grade)
Examination topics
Course material
Reading list
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14(1), 43–64.Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the Autistic Child have a “Theory of Mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46.Bayne, T. (2006), Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will. In S. Pockett, W.P. Banks, and S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (pp. 169–186). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Block, N. (2005). Review of Action in Perception. The Journal of Philosophy, 102(5), 259–272.Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 3.Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.Dennett, D. C. (2002). Quining Qualia. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classic and Contemporary Readings (pp. 226–246). New York: Oxford University Press.Gallagher, S. (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 83–108.Gopnik, A. (1996). The Scientist as Child. Philosophy of Science, 63(4), 485–514.
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications - Reading in Mind and Language. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge: MIT Press. Chapter 1.
O’Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 24(05), 939–973.Prinz, J. (2006). Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. PSYCHE, 12(1), 1–19. Rosenthal, D. M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. J. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 729–753). Cambridge: MIT Press.Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481.Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will. American Psychologist, 54(7).Zahavi, D. (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind? In D. Zahavi, T. Grünbaum, & J. Parnas (Eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 35–63). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Brain Sciences, 24(05), 939–973.Prinz, J. (2006). Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. PSYCHE, 12(1), 1–19. Rosenthal, D. M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. J. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (pp. 729–753). Cambridge: MIT Press.Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481.Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will. American Psychologist, 54(7).Zahavi, D. (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind? In D. Zahavi, T. Grünbaum, & J. Parnas (Eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 35–63). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Th 11.05.2023 11:27
- Reflect on empirical and technological developments from a philosophical perspective
- Critically reflect on the role of philosophy as part of cognitive science
- Become familiar with the method of analytical philosophy of mindContents: The seminar serves as a forum for an in-depth discussion of themes introduced in the course “Current Developments in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science” and will be oriented more closely toward a selection of seminal readings.Methods: Students will give an online-presentation primarily as a means to guide the discussion.