180207 PS Waht ist Time? (2024W)

The aim of this course is to provide an introduction to the philosophy of time. More specifically, we will address the ontological question of the nature of time. Participants will be familiarised with the main approaches to time (absolutism, reductionism, idealism) as well as with key texts in theoretical philosophy (e.g., Timaeus, Critique of Pure Reason). In the process, they will also practice argumentation strategies and methods of academic work.

Content: Kurt Gödel (1949) once remarked that time remains *the* philosophical question even after Einstein (cf. p. 557). And indeed, a look at the history of philosophy shows that the question of the nature of time has always been of fundamental importance and has gained additional popularity over the past century.
In this seminar, this question will be addressed by examining the three main directions in the history of philosophy that have emerged as answers. The differences between and within these directions will be discussed.
First, absolutism (also known as Platonism) comes into focus, according to which time is something physical that would continue to exist even if there were neither change nor subjects, i.e. even if the world were characterized by stasis and remained inexperienced. Time is likened here to a container that exists independently of whether it is filled or not. Plato and Newton are often associated with this view. In Hindu philosophy, this view is often advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.
Next, reductionism (also known as relationism) will be discussed. Proponents of this position argue that time is reducible to changes, meaning that in a static or empty universe, there would be no time. In European philosophy, this view is associated with Leibniz and, though controversially, with Aristotle. In Hindu philosophy, it is comparable to the classical view of the Sākṃhya school, where the principle of change, the dynamic prakṛti, is one of the two fundamental realities to which time is reducible.
Finally, idealism will be discussed, the view that time is a construct of the mind, meaning that without a subject, there would be no time. Kant, addressing the debate between the absolutist Newton and the reductionist Leibniz, argues in his Transcendental Aesthetic that both absolutism and reductionism are flawed and proposes instead that time should be viewed as a subjective form of our intuition. McTaggart, in his famous essay The Unreality of Time, argues that any understanding of temporal order, whether absolute or relative, is an illusion, and thus there is no such thing as time. A similar view is held in Hinduism by the Advaita-Vedānta school, which posits that there is one fundamental and unchanging reality that is timeless. Therefore, time is merely an appearance (māyā).
Given that the history of physics has always interacted with the philosophical development concerning the question of time, it cannot be ignored here. Thus, after addressing the three main directions in the history of philosophy, the course leader will provide a summarizing, comprehensible overview of the current state of arguments derived from physics regarding time.

Methods: The three main directions in the philosophy of time will be discussed sequentially. Differences between and within these directions will be highlighted. Some participants will summarize and comment on primary texts in presentations. These oral presentations will be followed by discussions, so it is desirable for all participants to read the texts before the weekly sessions. After covering the three main directions in the philosophy of time, the course leader will provide a summarizing, comprehensible overview of the current state of arguments derived from physics regarding time. At the end of the semester, there will be a debate in three groups where students must choose and argue for one of the three directions.