Universität Wien

180379 VO The Sources of Epistemic Normativity (2009W)

3.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie

Pünktlicher Beginn im November 2009!

Details

Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

Wednesday 04.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 11.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 18.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 25.11. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 02.12. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 09.12. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 16.12. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 13.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 20.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday 27.01. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

We criticise each other's beliefs all the time. We say things like 'She only believes her husband faithful because she is scared of divorce'; things like 'This outright contradicts everything you believe about him'; and things like 'He only believes that of her because she is a girl and he always thought girls stupid'. These criticisms imply that the belief in question was not formed properly. It was not formed, in other words, in accordance with procedures for correct belief-formation, maintenance and revision. 'Epistemic norms' are norms prescribing such procedures. Examples of epistemic norm is 'You ought not to believe on insufficient evidence' and 'You ought not to have inconsistent beliefs'. We generally observe epistemic norms. When I tell you that your belief is not supported by the evidence or is inconsistent with other beliefs you have, you don't just shrug and ignore me. You either try to show me that I am wrong or you revise your belief. But why should we observe epistemic norms? This is one way of asking after the source of epistemic normativity. The central purpose of this course is to explore various accounts of this source. Three answers are floated in the literature:
(1) The pragmatic:We should observe epistemic norms if we want to attain our goals.
(2) The moral:We should observe epistemic norms in order to be virtuous.
(3) The constitutive:Acceptance of epistemic norms is constitutive of belief/ agency.
The course examines the scope and plausibility of these accounts of the source of epistemic normativity.

Programme
Week 1 - Introduction: What is our question and does it make sense?

Week 2 - The evolutionary pragmatic answer
Lycan, William G. (1988) 'Epistemic Value' Judgement and Justification. (Cambrige: CUP).

Week 3 - The hard pragmatic answer
Stich, Stephen P. (1990) 'A pragmatic account of cognitive evaluation', Chap. 6, The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Week4 - The soft pragmatic answer
Kornblith, Hilary (1993) 'Epistemic Normativity' Synthèse 94: 357-378.

Week 5 - The (instrumental) moral answer
Clifford, W. K. (1879) 'The Ethics of Belief' TEthics of Belief. Burger, A. (ed) (Roseville: Dry Bones, 2001).

Week 6 - The (constitutive) moral answer
Zagzebski, L. T. (2004) 'Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What we Care About' Phil. Papers, 33: 3, 353-377.

Week 7 - The (agency) constitutive answer
Railton, P. (1997) 'On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action', in Cullity, G. and Gaut, B. (eds) Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon).

Week 8 - The (belief) constitutive answer
Shah, N. & Velleman, D. (2005) 'Doxastic Deliberation' The Philosophical Review, 114: 4, 497-534.

Week 9 - A constitutive answer not in the literature
Mitova, Veli (2009) 'A quasi-pragmatist explanation of our ethics of belief.' Teorema, 28(3).

Week 10 -Putting it all together

Assessment and permitted materials

Regular attendance, active participation in discussions, a 15-20 page essay on a topic related to the course.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

(1)To develop a detailed critical understanding of each of the four broad answers. (2) To establish fruitful connections amongst these answers. (3) To acquire a general method for asking after the source of any normative domain, e.g., morality.

Examination topics

Each session starts with a lecture and is followed by a discussion of the reading for that session. Having read the prescribed paper is therefore essential. But since this debate is emergent and we will need to do construction work together, knowledge of the secondary literature will be needed.

Reading list

Primary Readings: see 'Programme' above.

Secondary Readings
Craig, Edward (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (New York: Oxford University Press).

Blackburn, S. (2005) 'Faith, Belief, and Reason' Truth: A Guide (Oxford, New York : OUP).

Cullity, Garett and Gaut, Berys (eds) (1997) Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon).

Dreier, James (1997) 'Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality' in Cullity and Gaut.

Feldman, Richard (1988) 'Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection' Philosophy of Science, 55 (218-227).
___ (2000) ' The Ethics of Belief' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 3, 667-695.

Foot, Philippa (1978) 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives' in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

Gibbard, Allan (2005) 'Truth and Correct Belief' in Sosa and Villanueva (eds) Philosophical Issues, 15, Normativity (Supplement to NOUS).

Heal, Jane (1988) 'The Disinterested Search for Truth' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (97-108).

Heil, John (1992) 'Believing Reasonably' NOUS 26: 1 (47-62).

Korsgaard, Christine M. (1983) 'Two Distinctions in Goodness' Philosophical Review, 92: 2 (169-195).
___ (1997) 'The Normativity of Instrumental Reason' in Cullity and Gaut (1997).

Mitova, Veli (2008) 'Why W. K. Clifford was a closet pragmatist.' Philosophical Papers, 37(3): 471-489.

Quine, W. V. (1995) 'Epistemology Naturalized' reprinted in Moser, Paul K. and vander Nat, Arnold (eds) Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, Second Edition (New York: OUP).

Railton, Peter (2003) Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Shah, Nishi (2003) 'How Truth Governs Belief' The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No.4 (pp.447 - 482).

Stanley, Jason (2005) Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford: Clarendon).

Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn (2006) 'No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief' The Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 225, 499-516.

Wedgwood, Ralph (2002) 'The aim of belief' Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 267 - 297.

Williams, Bernard (1973) 'Deciding to believe' Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP).

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus (1996) Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge (Cambridge: CUP).

Zemach, Eddy M. (1997) 'Practical Reasons for Belief?' NOUS 31:4, 1997 (525-527).

Association in the course directory

BA M 5.4, § 4.1.4, PP § 57.3.4

Last modified: Sa 08.07.2023 00:17