180662 SE Epistemic Agency (2010S)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
All course materials to be found at:http://velimitova.weebly.com/students-2010.html
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Tu 09.02.2010 12:00 to Mo 01.03.2010 12:00
- Deregistration possible until We 31.03.2010 12:00
Details
max. 45 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
Wednesday
03.03.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
10.03.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
17.03.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
24.03.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
14.04.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
21.04.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
28.04.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
05.05.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
12.05.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
19.05.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
26.05.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
02.06.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
09.06.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
16.06.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
23.06.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Wednesday
30.06.
15:00 - 17:00
Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
We are agents in the world - unlike plants, animals and infants, we form intentions, act on them and are held responsible for our actions. But we would not have intentions and would not act unless we had beliefs. I would not apologise to you if I didn't believe that I had hurt you. You would not jump in the water to save the drowning child if you didn't believe that she was drowning. Are we then responsible for the way in which we form our beliefs? Do we have obligations and duties to form them in some way (say, by following the evidence) rather than another (say, by throwing a coin and letting the outcome dictate what we believe)? Are there such things as epistemic virtues and vices - i.e., some character traits which make us good believers (such as open-mindedness, say) and other character traits which make us vicious believers (such as the habit of jumping to conclusions, say)? Analytic epistemologists have recently become increasingly concerned with these questions. Answering them means developing a theory of epistemic agency. This is the theory we will be developing in this course. The course is divided in three parts. In Part 1 we think about whether we can be held responsible for our beliefs. In Parts 2 and 3 we consider two ways of understanding the idea of epistemic virtues and vices.
Assessment and permitted materials
Regular attendance, one presentation, active participation in discussions, two 10-page essays on pre-set topics.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
To develop a detailed critical understanding of the central questions of the debate and too establish fruitful connections amongst these questions.
Examination topics
Each session starts with a lecture and is followed by a discussion of the reading for that session. Having read the prescribed paper is therefore essential. But since this debate is emergent and we will need to do construction work together, knowledge of the secondary literature will be also needed.
Reading list
SECONDARY READINGSBaehr, J., 2008, 'Four Varieties of Character-based Virtue Epistemology' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45, 469-502. link: http://myweb.lmu.edu/jbaehr/Four%20Varieties.docChurch, Jennifer (2002) 'Taking it to heart: What choice do we have?' The Monist, 85: 3.Clifford, W. K. (1879) 'The Ethics of Belief' Lectures and Essays by W. K. Clifford, edited by Lesley Stephen & Frederick Pollock (London: Macmillan).Code, Lorraine (1987) Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover: UP of New England).
DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L. (eds) (2002) Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and
Epistemology (Oxford University Press).Fairweather, Abrol & Zagzebski, Linda (eds) (2001) Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press).Greco, John (2002) 'Virtues in Epistemology' The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Hieronymi, Pamela (2008) 'Responsibility for believing' Synthese 161.Kvanvig, Jonathan (2010) 'Sosa on Virtue Epistemology' Critica, forthcoming. http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Jonathan_Kvanvig/www/pdf/Sosa.pdfMontmarquet, James (1993) Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield).Owens, David (2000) Reason without Freedom: The problem of epistemic normativity (London: Routledge).Pritchard, D. and M. S. Brady (eds) (2006) Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology, special issue of Philosophical Studies 130.Pritchard, D. and M. S. Brady (eds) (2003)Virtues: Moral and Epistemic, special double issue of Metaphilosophy 34, 2003.Zagzebski, Linda (1996) Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: CUP).
DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L. (eds) (2002) Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and
Epistemology (Oxford University Press).Fairweather, Abrol & Zagzebski, Linda (eds) (2001) Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press).Greco, John (2002) 'Virtues in Epistemology' The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Hieronymi, Pamela (2008) 'Responsibility for believing' Synthese 161.Kvanvig, Jonathan (2010) 'Sosa on Virtue Epistemology' Critica, forthcoming. http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Jonathan_Kvanvig/www/pdf/Sosa.pdfMontmarquet, James (1993) Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield).Owens, David (2000) Reason without Freedom: The problem of epistemic normativity (London: Routledge).Pritchard, D. and M. S. Brady (eds) (2006) Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology, special issue of Philosophical Studies 130.Pritchard, D. and M. S. Brady (eds) (2003)Virtues: Moral and Epistemic, special double issue of Metaphilosophy 34, 2003.Zagzebski, Linda (1996) Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: CUP).
Association in the course directory
MA M 2, § 4.1.4 und § 4.1.3
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:36