210128 SE M7: State Activity, Policy and Governance Analyses (2021S)
Inter-election democracy
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
REMOTE
Die Lehre wird im SoSe 2021 zu Beginn voraussichtlich digital stattfinden. Je nach Lage wird auf hybride oder Vor-Ort-Lehre umgestellt. Die Lehrenden werden die konkrete Organisationsform und Lehrmethodik auf ufind und Moodle bekannt geben, wobei auch mit kurzfristigen Änderungen gerechnet werden muss.Eine Anmeldung über u:space innerhalb der Anmeldephase ist erforderlich! Eine nachträgliche Anmeldung ist NICHT möglich.
Studierende, die der ersten Einheit unentschuldigt fern bleiben, verlieren ihren Platz in der Lehrveranstaltung.Achten Sie auf die Einhaltung der Standards guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis und die korrekte Anwendung der Techniken wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens und Schreibens.
Plagiierte und erschlichene Teilleistungen führen zur Nichtbewertung der Lehrveranstaltung (Eintragung eines 'X' im Sammelzeugnis).
Die Lehrveranstaltungsleitung kann Studierende zu einem notenrelevanten Gespräch über erbrachte Teilleistungen einladen.
Studierende, die der ersten Einheit unentschuldigt fern bleiben, verlieren ihren Platz in der Lehrveranstaltung.Achten Sie auf die Einhaltung der Standards guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis und die korrekte Anwendung der Techniken wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens und Schreibens.
Plagiierte und erschlichene Teilleistungen führen zur Nichtbewertung der Lehrveranstaltung (Eintragung eines 'X' im Sammelzeugnis).
Die Lehrveranstaltungsleitung kann Studierende zu einem notenrelevanten Gespräch über erbrachte Teilleistungen einladen.
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Th 04.02.2021 08:00 to Th 18.02.2021 08:00
- Registration is open from Mo 22.02.2021 08:00 to Mo 01.03.2021 08:00
- Deregistration possible until Mo 22.03.2021 23:59
Details
max. 50 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
- Tuesday 09.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 16.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 23.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 13.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 20.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 27.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 04.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 11.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 18.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 01.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 08.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 15.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 22.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
- Tuesday 29.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Digital
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
Active participation, student presentations, term paper
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
(1) Presence in seminar (with a maximum of 2 agreed-upon missings) and active participation in the discussions (requiring engagement with the readings and substantive problems) (15 % of the grade)
(2) Two seminar presentations on texts (30 % of the grade)
(3) Seminar paper ca. 5000¬–6000 words, without references (55 % of the grade)
(2) Two seminar presentations on texts (30 % of the grade)
(3) Seminar paper ca. 5000¬–6000 words, without references (55 % of the grade)
Examination topics
Reading list
References (Selection):
Arndt, C., C. Jensen & G. Wenzelburger (2021). Voters' wrath? Policy change and government popularity. Governance, 34:147–169.Bernardi, L. (2020). From popularity to vulnerability: An application to dynamic representation in coalition governments. Party Politics, 26(4): 459–470.Betz, T. (2020). The electoral costs of policy commitments. Political Science Research and Methods, 8: 30–44.De Vries, C. E. & S. B. Hobolt (2015). Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition. Comparative Political Studies, 48(9): 1159–1185.Drazen, A. & M. Eslava (2010). Electoral Manipulation Via Voter-Friendly Spending: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39–52.Ecker, A. & T. M. Meyer (2020). Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 50: 261–280.Ennser-Jedenastik, L. & G. Schumacher (2015). Why Some Leaders Die Hard (and Others Don’t): Party Goals, Party Institutions, and How They Interact. In W. Cross & J. B. Pilet (eds.), The Politics of Party Leadership: A Cross-National Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ferland, B. (2020). Party responsiveness to public opinion and party supporters: Revisiting the mechanisms and motivations. Party Politics, 26(4): 366–378.Golder, S. N. (2006). Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 36(2): 193–212.Hjermitslev, I. B. (2020). The electoral cost of coalition participation: Can anyone escape? Party Politics, 26(4): 510–520.
Huber, L. et al. (2020). Disseminating legislative debates: How legislators communicate the parliamentary agenda. Party Politics, online first, DOI: 10.1177/1354068820982555.König, P. & G. Wenzelburger (2017). Honeymoon in the Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of the Strategic Timing of Austerity Policies and Their Effect on Government Popularity in Three Countries. Comparative European Politics 15(6), 991–1015.Lupia, A. & K. Strøm (1995). Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections. American Political Science Review, 89(3): 648–665.Maravall, J. M. (2010). Accountability in Coalition Governments. Annual Review of Political Science, 13: 81–100.Müller, S. (2020) Media Coverage of Campaign Promises Throughout the Electoral Cycle. Political Communication, 37:5, 696–718.Müller, S. & T. Louwerse (2020). The electoral cycle effect in parliamentary democracies. Political Science Research and Methods, 8: 795–802.Pardos-Prado, S. & I. Sagarzazu (2019). Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle. Journal of Politics, 81(2): 441–455.Sagarzazu, I. & H. Klüver (2017). Coalition Governments and Party Competition: Political Communication Strategies of Coalition Parties. Political Science Research and Method 5(2): 333–49.Schleiter, P. & M. Tavits (2018). Voter Reactions to Incumbent Opportunism. Journal of Politics 80(4): 1185–1196.Schleiter, P. & T. Beckman (2020). Opportunistic Election Timing, a Complement or Substitute for Economic Manipulation? Journal of Politics, 82(3): 1127–1141.Schröder, V. & C. Stecker (2018). The Temporal Dimension of Issue Competition. Party Politics 24(6): 708–718.Seeberg, H. B. (2020). The impact of opposition criticism on the public’s evaluation of government competence. Party Politics, 26(4): 484–495.Seeberg, H. B. (2020). First avoidance, then engagement: Political parties’ issue competition in the electoral cycle. Party Politics, online first DOI: 10.1177/1354068820970353.Klüver, H. & Spoon, J.-J. (2020). Helping or Hurting? How Governing as a Junior Coalition Partner Influences Electoral Outcomes. Journal of Politics, 82(4): 1131–1142.Thomson, R. et al. (2017). The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing. American Journal of Political Science 61(3): 527–542.
Arndt, C., C. Jensen & G. Wenzelburger (2021). Voters' wrath? Policy change and government popularity. Governance, 34:147–169.Bernardi, L. (2020). From popularity to vulnerability: An application to dynamic representation in coalition governments. Party Politics, 26(4): 459–470.Betz, T. (2020). The electoral costs of policy commitments. Political Science Research and Methods, 8: 30–44.De Vries, C. E. & S. B. Hobolt (2015). Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition. Comparative Political Studies, 48(9): 1159–1185.Drazen, A. & M. Eslava (2010). Electoral Manipulation Via Voter-Friendly Spending: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39–52.Ecker, A. & T. M. Meyer (2020). Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 50: 261–280.Ennser-Jedenastik, L. & G. Schumacher (2015). Why Some Leaders Die Hard (and Others Don’t): Party Goals, Party Institutions, and How They Interact. In W. Cross & J. B. Pilet (eds.), The Politics of Party Leadership: A Cross-National Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ferland, B. (2020). Party responsiveness to public opinion and party supporters: Revisiting the mechanisms and motivations. Party Politics, 26(4): 366–378.Golder, S. N. (2006). Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 36(2): 193–212.Hjermitslev, I. B. (2020). The electoral cost of coalition participation: Can anyone escape? Party Politics, 26(4): 510–520.
Huber, L. et al. (2020). Disseminating legislative debates: How legislators communicate the parliamentary agenda. Party Politics, online first, DOI: 10.1177/1354068820982555.König, P. & G. Wenzelburger (2017). Honeymoon in the Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of the Strategic Timing of Austerity Policies and Their Effect on Government Popularity in Three Countries. Comparative European Politics 15(6), 991–1015.Lupia, A. & K. Strøm (1995). Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections. American Political Science Review, 89(3): 648–665.Maravall, J. M. (2010). Accountability in Coalition Governments. Annual Review of Political Science, 13: 81–100.Müller, S. (2020) Media Coverage of Campaign Promises Throughout the Electoral Cycle. Political Communication, 37:5, 696–718.Müller, S. & T. Louwerse (2020). The electoral cycle effect in parliamentary democracies. Political Science Research and Methods, 8: 795–802.Pardos-Prado, S. & I. Sagarzazu (2019). Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle. Journal of Politics, 81(2): 441–455.Sagarzazu, I. & H. Klüver (2017). Coalition Governments and Party Competition: Political Communication Strategies of Coalition Parties. Political Science Research and Method 5(2): 333–49.Schleiter, P. & M. Tavits (2018). Voter Reactions to Incumbent Opportunism. Journal of Politics 80(4): 1185–1196.Schleiter, P. & T. Beckman (2020). Opportunistic Election Timing, a Complement or Substitute for Economic Manipulation? Journal of Politics, 82(3): 1127–1141.Schröder, V. & C. Stecker (2018). The Temporal Dimension of Issue Competition. Party Politics 24(6): 708–718.Seeberg, H. B. (2020). The impact of opposition criticism on the public’s evaluation of government competence. Party Politics, 26(4): 484–495.Seeberg, H. B. (2020). First avoidance, then engagement: Political parties’ issue competition in the electoral cycle. Party Politics, online first DOI: 10.1177/1354068820970353.Klüver, H. & Spoon, J.-J. (2020). Helping or Hurting? How Governing as a Junior Coalition Partner Influences Electoral Outcomes. Journal of Politics, 82(4): 1131–1142.Thomson, R. et al. (2017). The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing. American Journal of Political Science 61(3): 527–542.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Fr 12.05.2023 00:19
Relevant situations and topics include:
• Forming a government
• Electoral performance and party leaders’ accountability
• The cost of governing and the clarity of responsibility
• How do parties in government keep their voters loyal?
• Coalition dynamics
• How to deal with the opposition (government)?
• Can losers win?
• Which tricks governments play to improve their re-election chances?
• Preparing for the next election, preparing for the next government formation