390022 DK PhD-M: Management Control (2012W)
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from Th 06.09.2012 09:00 to Th 20.09.2012 14:00
- Registration is open from We 26.09.2012 10:00 to We 06.02.2013 12:00
- Deregistration possible until We 06.02.2013 12:00
Details
max. 15 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes
Currently no class schedule is known.
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
Depending on class size the midterm exam can be replaced by student presentations of take-home exercises. Otherwise, there will be written midterm and final exams. Both midterm (resp. presentations) and final score points will be equally weighted in calculating the final score. Score points for class room participation will also be added to calculate the final score. A passing grade strictly requires to earn at least 50% of the total available score points in the course. Course attendance is obligatory; leaves will only be granted in case of a documented illness or the like -- a maximum of 10 % of class room time may be missed in this case.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
The course introduces contract theory as a methodological tool for analyzing personnel, organizational, financial and public economics problems. The ultimate course goal is twofold: a) generally, students achieve an understanding of contract theory as modelling tool within their fields of application; b) specifically, interested students learn the basic framework to develop their own contractual models and/or, respectively, empirical investigations of contract theoretical models.
Examination topics
Intensive (small) group lecturing; depending on size and time, student presentations of take-home work.
Reading list
The course is based on the following book:Salanie, B. (1997), The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.For the successful completion of the take-home and final exams, the following books are additionally required:Bolton, P. und M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.
Association in the course directory
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:46
II. The general revelation principle
III. Moral hazard
IV. Adverse selection
V. Implicit contracts
VI. Imperfect enforcement
VII. The principal-agent structure as a negotiation problemPrerequisites: To enter the course, students must possess a qualifying degree ("Diplom" or masters degree) in business, economics or equivalent university studies. They must have very good command of intermediate micro-economics, preferably with emphasis on game-theoretic approaches, and the respective mathematics applied in microeconomic modelling.