Universität Wien

390032 DK PhD-M: Management Control (2020W)

5.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 39 - Doktoratsstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

service email address: opim.bda@univie.ac.at

Moodle

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 13 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes

DO 6.10.2020 - 26.01.2021 19.00-21:00 HS 7.
All November classes will be held in an online format via BBB.

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

I. Contract theory as an analytical tool
II. The general revelation principle
III. Moral hazard
IV. Adverse selection
V. Implicit contracts
VI. Imperfect enforcement
VII. The principal-agent structure as a negotiation problem

Prerequisites: To enter the course, students must possess a qualifying degree ("Diplom" or masters degree) in business, economics or equivalent university studies. They must have very good command of intermediate micro-economics, preferably with emphasis on game-theoretic approaches, and the respective mathematics applied in microeconomic modelling.

Assessment and permitted materials

added to calculate the final score. Score points for class room participation will also be added to calculate the final score.
A passing grade strictly requires to earn at least 50% of the total available score points in the course. Course attendance is obligatory; leaves will only be granted in case of a documented illness or the like -- a maximum of 10 % of class room time may be missed in this case.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

The course introduces contract theory as a methodological tool for analyzing personnel, organizational, financial and public economics problems. The ultimate course goal is twofold: a) generally, students achieve an understanding of contract theory as modelling tool within their fields of application; b) specifically, interested students learn the basic framework to develop their own contractual models and/or, respectively, empirical investigations of contract theoretical models.
Please note that all of your submissions may be checked for plagiarism using Turnitin.

Examination topics

Intensive (small) group lecturing; depending on size and time, student presentations of take-home work.

Reading list

The course is based on the following book:

Salanie, B. (1997), The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.

For the successful completion of the take-home and final exams, the following books are additionally helpful:

Bolton, P. und M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.

For the successful completion of the take-home and final exams, the following books are additionally required:

Bolton, P. und M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2202), The Theory of Incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock, UK.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Tu 03.11.2020 10:50